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Makes you wonder what the polluters are doing, that they feel they
need their own special law to protect them from law students suing
them for free as part of a school project.
And I don’t mean that in a disparaging way toward law students at
all. But when big industry seems to be so afraid of people who are
still learning their profession, you’d have to think they’re doing
some stuff so blatantly illegal that even a student can nail them for
it.1

Since 1976, when the first environmental clinic was started at the
University of Oregon’s law school, clinics have proliferated. Today,
approximately one out of five law schools has an environmental
clinic.2 With respect to clinics in general, the Association of American
Law Schools Directory of Law Teachers lists “nearly 1400 full-time
faculty teaching clinical courses.”3 Yet far from being an
uncontroverted part of the academic landscape, clinics—particularly
environmental clinics—have endured political blowback4 from
challenging the environmentally destructive behavior of major
economic interests. The effectiveness of environmental clinics is no
greater than established environmental organizations—perhaps less
effective given the length of time it takes for law students guided by
faculty to mount a legal challenge and the complexity and difficulty
of the cases these clinics take on. Nonetheless, environmental clinics
repeatedly find themselves the target of efforts to shut them down,
restricted in the types of cases and/or clients they can take on, and
1 Anonymous, Comment to Bill Would Ban Law Clinics Suing State,
2THEADVOCATE.COM (May 18, 2010, 12:12 PM), http://www.2theadvocate.com/news
/94030164.html.
2 Gabriel Nelson, Law: Students’ Role in Farm Pollution Suit Angers Md. Lawmakers,
Sparks Nat’l Debate, GREENWIRE (Apr. 8, 2010, 12:27 PM), http://www.eenews.net
/public/Greenwire/2010/04/08/1. Thirty-five of those clinics, including one from British
Columbia, Canada, participate in a listserv maintained by the University of South
Carolina’s law school, on which clinicians share information and collectively problem
solve. Clinics from many large state-funded schools are on the list.
3 Robert R. Kuehn & Peter A. Joy, Lawyering in the Academy: The Intersection of
Academic Freedom and Professional Responsibility, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 97, 98 (2009)
[hereinafter Kuehn & Joy, Lawyering in the Academy] (noting in addition that “a number
of law professors act as attorneys in cases handled as part of law school seminars, applied
legal research and writing classes, or live-client components of related upper-level
substantive courses.” Id. (footnotes omitted)). See also id. (“[T]he American Bar
Association . . . requires every accredited law school to offer substantial opportunities in
live-client or other real-life practice experiences.”).
4 Nelson, supra note 2.
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limited by supervisory boards with the power of case approval. Why
is this? What is it about law students working for credits and grades
that powerful interests find so threatening that they spend their
resources on eliminating clinics instead of confronting them in court?
Is the attack on clinics part of a broader attack on public access to the
courts for righting environmental wrongs? Do these attacks reflect
something about the nature of the attacker and her victim?
This Article seeks to answer those questions, and concludes that
clinics, like environmental organizations, function in an environment
that is exceptionally hostile to the types of clients they represent and
the cases they bring. This means that the claims environmental clinics
file, like those filed by the national groups, will be met with a barrage
of opposing filings based on a number of jurisdictional and other
challenges enabled by the U.S. Supreme Court’s anti-public interest
jurisprudence. Unlike the well-funded, publicly visible, and widely
supported national organizations, environmental clinics are more
vulnerable to less conspicuous attacks brought directly by the
economic interests they challenge and their political supporters.5
Perhaps clinics unwittingly invite these attacks that in turn weaken
their ability to function in this already hostile environment. The
combination of the two can create a perfect storm for environmental
clinics.
Even more curious is the role that lawyers play in attacks on clinics
and the bullying techniques they use to discourage clinic-initiated
litigation. There is something about students that brings the bully out
in those who face them across the table6 that goes beyond the usual
5 The chief, often sole protectors of these clinics are other environmental clinics and
professional organizations such as the American Bar Association and the Association of
American Law Schools, who use their organizing and institutional capacities to mount
counter campaigns. See, e.g., Letter from Susan Westerberg Prager, Exec. Dir., Chief
Exec. Officer, Ass’n of Am. Law Sch., to Chancellor William E. Kirwan, Univ. Sys. of
Md., and Clifford M. Kendall, Chair, Bd. of Regents, Univ. Sys. of Md. (Mar. 31, 2010)
(offering assistance in combating concerns raised about the University of Maryland’s
environmental clinic), reprinted in AALSNEWS (The Ass’n of Am. Law Sch., D.C.), May
2010, at 2, available at http://www.aals.org/documents/newsletter/may2010newsletter.pdf;
accord Statement of ABA President Lamm Re: Proposed Legislation Affecting Funding for
University of Maryland School of Law, ABANOW (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.abanow.org
/2010/04/statement-of-aba-president-lamm-re-proposed-legislation-affecting-funding-for
-university-of-maryland-school-of-law/.
6 I have witnessed this behavior many times during my nearly twenty years as a director
of an environmental clinic at Georgetown University Law Center and it has never ceased
to amaze me. Sometimes this behavior has revealed itself in letters threatening to cut off
contributions to the Law Center or to seek sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
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reasons given for these attacks—namely, that environmental clinics
empower people who are otherwise without power to confront those
who disregard their interest, that they are successful, and that they
have enormous staying power and endless student enthusiasm. This
behavior, although part of the general incivility problem afflicting the
legal profession, is something more, and has to do with the nature of
today’s lawyers and the context in which they learned how to be
lawyers and practice law. Although many articles have been written
about attacks on environmental clinics,7 none has identified this
second reason—the milieu in which lawyers are educated and
trained—and placed it in the broader context of judicial hostility
toward environmental claims brought against established economic
interests.
This Article lays the groundwork for these conclusions by first
briefly discussing the origins of clinics and clinical pedagogy in
general. Then it describes the various attacks on the clinics, some
consequences of those attacks, and how certain responses to those
attacks run afoul of basic ethical precepts as well as notions of
academic freedom.8 The third part of the Article, after briefly listing
some of the conventional reasons for these attacks, focuses on a less
conventional one—namely, that they are fueled by the asocial
behavior of lawyers who are in the vanguard of many of these attacks.
It shows how such behavior is akin to that of a schoolyard bully who,
in sensing a weaker opponent, acts out in ways that have been fodder
for psychological literature. This part of the Article also describes the
various barriers the Court has erected that make it difficult for public
interest litigants, particularly poorly funded and understaffed
environmental clinics, to prosecute legal claims representing
Civil Procedure. Other times the behavior has manifested itself in shouting and threatening
not to hire future graduates of the program if the clinic persists in its representation.
7 See, e.g., Peter A. Joy, Political Interference with Clinical Legal Education: Denying
Access to Justice, 74 TUL. L. REV. 235 (1999); Kuehn & Joy, Lawyering in the Academy,
supra note 3; David Luban, Essay, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive
Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209 (2003); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Political
Interference in Law School Clinical Programs: Reflections on Outside Interference and
Academic Freedom, 11 J.C. & U.L. 179 (1984); Nina W. Tarr, Ethics, Internal Law School
Clinics, and Training the Next Generation of Poverty Lawyers, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1011 (2009).
8 Although the involvement of lawyers in these anti–environmental clinic campaigns
raises questions about their professional responsibility, others have discussed this problem
in detail; I do not revisit those issues here. See, e.g., Robert R. Kuehn & Peter A. Joy, An
Ethics Critique of Interference in Law School Clinics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1971 (2003)
[hereinafter Kuehn & Joy, Ethics Critique].
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individuals who threaten the economic and political status quo. The
Article concludes that the more conventional explanation for the
attacks against clinics are incomplete because they neither explain the
persistence of the attacks nor show how the combination of
intimidation and hostile judicial doctrine make it extremely difficult
for environmental clinics to do their job.
I
THE PUBLIC, PROFESSIONAL, AND PEDAGOGICAL BENEFITS
OF CLINICAL EDUCATION
Clinical education in United States law schools began in the 1960s
in response to a concern that the schools were not sufficiently training
their graduates to represent clients with real legal problems. To
respond to that problem, law schools developed law clinics, which
drew on the clinical model used by medical schools to the extent that
they focused on the use of real legal problems with real clients as a
means of training “law students in the skills that they [would] need to
become effective and ethical lawyers.”9 One impetus for the growth
of law school clinical programs was former Chief Justice Warren
Burger’s statement, subsequently published in a law journal article, in
which he reported that “‘from one-third to one-half of the lawyers
who appear in the serious cases are not really qualified to render fully
adequate representation’” and “called for expanded law school skills
programs: [saying] ‘[t]he law school . . . is where the groundwork
must be laid.’”10
There are many public, professional, and pedagogical benefits that
flow from law school clinics. First, law students offer legal assistance
to individuals who cannot otherwise get access to the courts.11 A
9 Letter from Susan Westerberg Prager, Exec. Dir., Chief Exec. Officer, Ass’n of Am.
Law Sch., to Chancellor William E. Kirwan, Univ. Sys. of Md., and Clifford M. Kendall,
Chair, Bd. of Regents, Univ. Sys. of Md. (Mar. 31, 2010) (explaining the origins of
clinical legal education), reprinted in AALSNEWS (The Ass’n of Am. Law Sch., D.C.),
May 2010, at 2, 3, available at http://www.aals.org/documents/newsletter/may2010
newsletter.pdf.
10 Jorge deNeve et al., Submission of the Association of American Law Schools to the
Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana Concerning the Review of the Supreme Court’s
Student Practice Rule, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 539, 542 (1997) (third alteration in original)
(quoting Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and
Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227,
233 (1973)).
11 See id. at 565 n.20 (“Law students as well as practicing attorneys may provide an
important source of legal representation for the indigent. . . . Given the huge increase in
law school enrollments over the past few years, . . . I think it plain that law students can be
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clinic, by “[p]roviding competent, effective legal representation to
affected individuals and communities[,] helps to ‘level the playing
field’ by empowering the relatively weak to stand up to and oppose
the inherently strong.”12 Clinics fill a gap left by private practitioners
who infrequently represent the type of clients clinics do because these
individuals not only lack the resources to pay them, but also often
raise claims that conflict with the interests of other clients the lawyer
represents. In addition, “[l]aw school clinics may be one of the few
places that the law school intersects with the local community.”13 This
can lessen “town and gown” friction for the law school. Because of
the type of clients clinics represent and the issues they bring to court,
clinic students may also educate judges, administrators, and
legislators about the importance of certain social justice issues and
may themselves be subsequently “inspired . . . to re-engage in public
interest lawyering” at a later point in their professional lives.14
These benefits are not restricted to the courts. Clinics can and do
play an important role in representing citizens before administrative
agencies. Professor Marc Mihaly underscores the importance of
providing expert help to citizens appearing before government
agencies.15 According to Professor Mihaly, “[i]f we believe in the
expected to make a significant contribution, quantitatively and qualitatively, to the
representation of the poor in many areas, including cases reached by today’s decision.”
(quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 44 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(alteration in original))).
12 Stephen Wizner & Robert Solomon, Law as Politics: A Response to Adam Babich,
11 CLINICAL L. REV. 473, 474 (2005).
13 Tarr, supra note 7, at 1043. See also id. (noting as evidence of community
relationship that “[f]or both good and bad, some clinics have set up advisory or community
boards that can influence what types of cases are accepted, the focus of the programs, and
other priorities”). But see Sameer M. Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14
CLINICAL L. REV. 355, 366 (2008) (“The external pressure of the market to train lawyers
for designated functions⎯unyielding in the current political moment⎯is both a direct and
indirect cause of the dilution (and sometimes, elimination) of the social justice mission of
law school clinics.”); id. at 387 (“Law schools and universities, especially private
institutions, are notoriously resistant to being held accountable to empowered community
organizations and to answering for the choices that are made in program development.”).
14 Robert Greenwald, The Role of Community-Based Clinical Legal Education in
Supporting Public Interest Lawyering, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 569, 570 (2007).
15 See Marc B. Mihaly, Citizen Participation in the Making of Environmental
Decisions: Evolving Obstacles and Potential Solutions Through Partnership With Experts
and Agents, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 207–08 (2009) (“[P]ublic participation without
expert assistance in the process of environmental decision-making gives an appearance of
participation without substance. . . . [It] is merely an opportunity to transmit views.
Members of the public miss statutory or regulatory deadlines and fail to exhaust their legal
remedies sufficiently to meet standing requirements. Their comments do not compete on a
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underlying purpose of public participation, we must equip citizens
with the agents and experts they need to make their participation
authentic and effective.”16 The complexity of “[g]overnance in
modern
industrial
democracy,”
especially
“environmental
governance,” puts a premium on providing citizens with expertise and
representation so that they can effectively participate in agency
decision making on environmental matters.17 This expertise renders
unassisted participation virtually useless.18 In the absence of
assistance, filing deadlines are often missed, and issues that litigants
want to bring before courts are not first properly vetted before the
regulatory agency; consequently, courts can easily dismiss them
based on the prudential exhaustion or ripeness doctrines.19
Unrepresented citizen commentators may also commonly raise issues
that are of concern to them and not to the decision-maker, with the
result that they are ignored and the commentator loses credibility with
the agency decision-maker.20 “[T]he difference between repetitive,
useless input and valuable input frequently lies in the quality of

technical level with the input of stakeholder and staff, proponents, and organized
stakeholders. The process of environmental review serves primarily as a post hoc
rationalization for a previously determined project design or rule formulation, and
participation consultants or staff integration of the unassisted lay citizen into a process
designed to give the appearance of participation without effect on the decision-makers.
Sophisticated representation and use of experts can change this trajectory. A thoughtful
partnership of citizens and experts can move the participatory effort from a mere
expression of position to an effective force, one that reverses unstated agreements among
project proponents and the agency, and brings citizens to the bargaining table with some
significant power to exercise.” (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
16 Id. at 223.
17 Id. at 226. Professor Mihaly singles out the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) as a congressional initiative that puts a premium on legal representation. See id. at
198–99 (“Despite this de jure empowerment, NEPA and the little NEPA’s have operated
to create a new forum for expertise more than empower the general public, and in the
process these statutes have given rise to a new class of professionals[, creating a new role
for attorneys].”); id. at 199 (“NEPA has created a new role for environmental consultants,
both attorneys and other experts, and it is they who participate in the process, and they
who ‘consume’ the participation rights.”).
18 Id. at 151.
19 See also id. at 211–12 (“The successful ‘invention’ and advocacy of an alternative,
one that may be quite unwelcome to agency staff or existing stakeholders, must be so
convincing that the agency or proponent’s counsel will advise that a conservative litigation
prevention strategy requires inclusion of the alternative in the environmental document.”).
20 See id. at 154 (“In [the absence of attorneys and consultant experts,] testimony
frequently misses statutory or regulatory deadlines, fails to raise the issues necessary to
exhaust administrative remedies, emphasizes policy issues of concern to the testigant,
rather than the decision-maker, and makes points without foundation.”).
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expertise provided to the citizen participant.”21 Professor Mihaly
believes that
[t]he assertion that public participation is alive and well in the
absence of assistance by experts and attorneys also advantages
those whose interests are served by minimizing the effects of
disparity in resources. If public participation matters, we must begin
with the understanding that it becomes most truly effective when
conjoined with representation and expertise.22

Good policy flows from a process that gives decision-makers the
benefit of sharply and cogently presenting different views.23 When
participation in either the regulatory or litigation process does not
provide “useful new evidence or concepts to decision-makers of a
rationalist government seeking the public interest,”24 it is ineffective
and will have no effect on the ultimate decision.25 It seems clear, at
least to Professor Mihaly, that citizens who wish to be effective either
in the regulatory or judicial process require experts to help them
“provide the sophisticated content, presentation, and political acuity
necessary to have effect. . . . [E]nvironmental decision-makers require
technical input, which unassisted lay participants cannot provide.”26
Mihaly goes on to say that

Id. at 161.
Id. at 226.
23 See id. at 162 (“Good policy flows from processes that give decision-makers the
benefit of conflicting views. The environmental arena is marked by pervasive conflict over
the application of theories, the underlying data, and disputes over how to incorporate the
resulting uncertainty into decision-making.”). See also David L. Markell, Citizen-Friendly
Approaches to Environmental Governance, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,362,
at 10,363 (2007), available at http://www.elr.info/articles/vol37/37.10362.pdf
(“Proponents suggest that greater opportunities for public involvement in agency
decisionmaking processes may help to enhance accountability and transparency in
governance, contribute to more informed, and thereby improved, results, and foster a
greater degree of connection between the governed and the governing (and a blurring of
the line between the two) that leads to greater social capital and societal trust.” (footnote
omitted)); id. (“[Procedural justice] literature suggests that citizens’ assessments of the
fairness of third-party decisionmaking procedures are important to judgments about the
legitimacy of such processes, independent of the outcomes of such procedures.”).
24 Mihaly, supra note 15, at 166.
25 See id. at 167 (“Presentation determines outcome. Citizens who do not understand
the rules and customs of the forum will make presentations that have the appearance, if not
the substance, of amateurism, and decision-makers will discount the material presented.”).
See also id. (“[U]nassisted lay participants who express conclusory opinions unsupported
by a substantial factual underlay will have no material effect on the ultimate outcome.”).
26 Id. at 168. Although Mihaly does not say that attorneys are the only experts who can
provide this expertise, he notes that it is usually lawyers who provide this assistance. Id.
21
22
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[d]ecision-makers, whether administrative law judges, corporate
leaders or governmental officials, need expertise . . . . The solution .
. . lies not in a naive embrace of unassisted lay citizen advocacy, but
rather in the ability to combine the energy and political value of a
grass roots group with the expertise necessary to craft a message
that will alter the course of an environmental decision-making
process.27

Environmental clinics can, and often do, play a critical role in
advising clients in the agency decision-making process.
Second, there seems to be near universal agreement that clinics
provide important academic and professional learning opportunities
for law students. According to Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean of the
University of California at Irvine’s law school,
There is no better way to prepare students to be lawyers than for
them to participate in clinical education. Clinics provide students
the opportunity to practice law under close supervision and thus can
provide students education in the lawyering skills and professional
values that they will be using as attorneys, whether they practice in
the private sector, government, or public interest organizations.
Law, which is inevitably abstract in a classroom, becomes real
when the student has to advise a client, negotiate a deal, or argue to
a judge.28

Clinical education is widely seen among law school educators as
enhancing the curriculum of law schools and as “an important
component of the overall education of our nation’s future lawyers.”29
Law school clinics are not only “unique vehicles for law schools to
expose law students to the professional skills that they must develop,”
but they also “strongly reinforce the non-clinical curriculum in
developing student’s legal analysis and research skills” as they
“provide law students paramount opportunities to engage in problem
solving, factual investigation, counseling, and negotiation.”30 They
offer “experiential learning through working with clients,” provide
Id. at 172.
Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Not Clinical Education?, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 35, 35
(2009).
29 deNeve et al., supra note 10, at 539. See also id. at 540 (discussing that clinical
education most decidedly “is not ‘an “amusing” academic exercise,’ but rather is an
important component of a quality law school curriculum”).
30 Id. at 543–44; see also id. at 544 (“Prior to the advent of clinical programs, these
skills ‘had previously been considered as incapable of being taught other than through the
direct practice experience’ of a newly-licensed lawyer.” (quoting ABA Task Force on Law
Schools and the Profession, Legal Education and Professional Development—An
Educational Continuum (Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession:
Narrowing the Gap) 234 (1992) [hereinafter MacCrate Report])).
27
28
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future lawyers “with the opportunity to better understand and help
bridge the access-to-justice gap of poor and low-income clients in
their own communities,” and help “to seed in law students a
professional commitment to public service.”31 Another benefit of law
school clinics, not often referred to, is that they can become “the law
school’s research laboratory for the development of new ideas”
through the litigation of often difficult and conceptually challenging
cases, providing an opportunity for clinicians and clinical students to
develop new legal theories and expand existing legal doctrine.32
“Clinical education is more than a trial advocacy course or a
clerkship at a law firm” because students are taught how to
reflect on the practice of law; how to integrate the doctrines learned
in traditional classes into practice; how to formulate hypotheses and
test them in the real world; how to approach each decision
creatively and analytically; how to identify and resolve issues of
professional responsibility; and how to expand existing legal
doctrine for the protection of the poor and powerless.33

Clinical instruction emphasizes the “conceptual underpinnings” of
skills that lawyers learn in their law practices.34 However, clinical
supervisors do a better job of assessing law student skills and
providing feedback on student performance because they “provide
more intensive guidance than is generally available in any other

Greenwald, supra note 14, at 569.
deNeve et al., supra note 10, at 555. These new theories and cases also provide grist
for scholarly writings such as this article. See also Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican
Vision of “Domestic Dependent Nations” in the Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty
Re-envisioned, Re-invigorated, and Re-empowered, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 443 (2005)
(representation of that same tribe led to an exploration of Indian sovereignty); Hope M.
Babcock, Administering the Clean Water Act: Do Regulators Have “Bigger Fish to Fry”
When It Comes to Addressing the Practice of Chumming on the Chesapeake Bay?, 21
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2007) (triggered by the filing of a state rulemaking petition); Hope M.
Babcock, Environmental Justice Clinics: Visible Models of Justice, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
3 (1995) (grew out of establishing one of the first environmental justice clinics in the
country); Hope M. Babcock, Reserved Indian Water Rights in Riparian Jurisdictions:
Water, Water Everywhere, Perhaps Some Drops for Us, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1203 (2006)
(grew out of the representation of an eastern state-recognized Indian tribe trying to protect
its traditional fishing grounds).
33 deNeve et al., supra note 10, at 544; see also id. at 547 (“[L]aw school clinics
provide unique educational opportunities for students to integrate ‘all the fundamental
lawyering skills’ and professional values into an actual practice setting. . . . Clinics provide
students with an opportunity to reflect on the development of their lawyering skills.
Clinics also provide an unmatched level of supervision and guidance.” (quoting MacCrate
Report, supra note 30, at 238)).
34 Id. at 545 (quoting MacCrate Report, supra note 30, at 234).
31
32
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setting.”35 This “distinguishes clinical training from the unstructured
practice experience students encounter after graduation.”36
The focus on applied learning and the close supervision provided in
clinical programs “enables students to relate their later practice
experience to concepts they have learned in law school.” . . . This
training can be translated into a fuller understanding of how to
recognize and resolve the ethical dilemmas encountered in actual
practice. The same dynamic applies to the training that clinical
programs offer in the organization and management of legal work.37

Students emerge from clinics with enhanced legal skills and a more
robust understanding of ethical issues than had they entered practice
without this training. As a result, they bring a higher level of
professionalism into the practice area or forum they chose to enter.
Despite their public, pedagogical, and professional benefits, law
school clinics—especially environmental clinics—have been subject
to persistent attacks by the economic and political interests they
challenge. The next section describes some of these attacks, their
sources, and their subtle and not so subtle impacts on environmental
clinical practice.
II
THE SORDID HISTORY OF SOME ANTI-CLINIC CAMPAIGNS,
THE TOOLS CLINICAL OPPONENTS USE,
AND SOME EFFECTS OF THESE CAMPAIGNS
This part of the Article briefly describes the history of some of the
more prominent attacks on law school clinics, particularly
environmental clinics. It identifies some of the tools used in those
campaigns by clinic opponents and then tries to grapple with some of
the effects of these campaigns not only on specific clinics, but on
public interest representation in general.

Id.
Id. (quoting Peter Toll Hoffman, Clinical Course Design and the Supervisory
Process, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277, 280 (1982)); see also id. (“This close and direct faculty
supervision, and the resulting ‘co-counsel’ relationship [creates] an effective adultlearning environment.” (quoting Frank S. Bloch, The Andragogical Basis of Clinical Legal
Education, 35 VAND. L. REV. 321, 347 (1982))).
37 Id. at 546 (citations omitted) (quoting MacCrate Report, supra note 30, at 234).
35
36
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A. A Brief Recitation of the History of Clinical Attacks
and of Some Conventional Reasons Why They Happen
Given the clients clinics represent and the established interests they
challenge on their clients’ behalf, it is no surprise that clinics in
general have engendered strong opposition.38
State-funded law schools have been the predominant target for such
interference. This is due to their vulnerability to the political views
of elected officials, the perceived impropriety of a state-funded
school suing to require another state entity to spend taxpayer
moneys, concerns that law clinic lawsuits against important
industries might undermine the economic base of the state,
disagreement with the use of taxpayer money to fund legal services
for the poor, or a desire to avoid “taking sides” on controversial
social or political issues.39

However, the repeated assaults on Tulane Law School’s
environmental clinic40 show the vulnerability of even private law
schools to such attacks.41 According to Professors Kuehn and Joy,
38 See Statement of ABA President Lamm Re: Proposed Legislation Affecting Funding
for University of Maryland School of Law, ABANOW (Apr. 1, 2010),
http://www.abanow.org/2010/04/statement-of-aba-president-lamm-re-proposed-legislation
-affecting-funding-for-university-of-maryland-school-of-law/ (“Law school clinical
programs provide immensely valuable public service in making legal assistance available
to members of society who might not otherwise have access to the justice system. At the
same time, [they teach students] about navigating court systems, about how the law works
to meet clients’ needs, and about lawyers’ fundamental professional responsibility to
advocate for clients who cannot advocate for themselves, even when the clients or their
causes might prove unpopular or controversial. . . . Yet there is a [legislative] proposal . . .
to withhold funds from the [law school] unless [the clinic] reports [to the legislature] on
clients and cases served by the school’s clinical legal program, expenditures for those
cases and funding sources [because it is an intrusion of the attorney client relationship].”);
Robert R. Kuehn, The Attack on the University of Maryland Law School Clinics, CLINICAL
LEGAL EDUC. ASS’N (Mar. 27, 2010), http://www.law.umaryland.edu/about/features
/enviroclinic/documents/CLEA.pdf (expressing concern over the attack on the University
of Maryland environmental clinic because it interferes with the clinic’s ability to
“zealously” represent its clients and to assure access to the justice system for all those who
cannot afford adequate legal counsel because of economic or social constraints,
particularly objecting to the interference happening “at the bidding of wealthy, powerful
poultry interests”).
39 Kuehn & Joy, Ethics Critique, supra note 8, at 1990; see also id. at 1977–89
(discussing attacks by state legislatures on state-funded clinics in Connecticut, Arkansas,
Colorado, *Idaho, Iowa, Tennessee, *Rutgers, *Arizona State University College of Law,
*Oregon (1981), *Tulane (1982), *Wyoming, *Pittsburgh (1985), and St. Mary’s law
schools (asterisked schools are publicly funded law schools)).
40 The continuing nature of these attacks was recently confirmed by a letter sent this
summer from the operator of a landfill that had been the subject of neighborhood disputes
since it opened in the early 1980s in a predominantly lower income, African American
community, threatening the members of Tulane University’s Board of Trustees and the
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[w]hile early attacks were often defended [by the attackers] on the
unfounded belief that clinics were interfering with the ability of
members of the bar to compete for paying clients, or motivated by a
desire to prevent lawsuits against the state, more recent attacks,
such as those on environmental law clinics, appear to be motivated
by a desire to protect the financial interests of clients, alumni, and
university donors. . . . [T]he true concern of law clinic critics is that
clinics are “bringing suits that wouldn’t be brought at all if the
clinic didn’t do it.”42

Environmental clinics have been the “principal lightning rod”
drawing most of these attacks.43 For example, a lawsuit by the
Maryland environmental clinic against a major poultry company
provoked a Maryland state senator to introduce legislation in the
General Assembly withholding
$750,000 in university funding until all 22 of the Law School’s
clinics submitted a report “listing and describing each legal case in
the past five years in which they participated in a court action,
including the client represented, complete delineation of the
expenditures for each case, and the source of funds for each
expenditure.”44

environmental clinic’s legal advisory board with a lawsuit for their collective failure to
properly supervise clinic attorneys. See Letter from Adam Babich, Professor, Tulane Univ.
Law Sch., to W.L. West, Lemle & Kelleher, L.L.P. (Sept. 2, 2010) (on file with author).
The triggering event for the letter was the clinic sending a notice of violation to the landfill
owners the previous month. Id.
41 Kuehn & Joy, Ethics Critique, supra note 8, at 1990. While serving as director of
Georgetown’s environmental clinic, I received one letter from a prominent Washington
lawyer threatening the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions if I did not withdraw from a case,
and the dean of the Law Center received a letter from the president of a company that we
were opposing in a state administrative licensing proceeding, also a graduate of the Law
Center, threatening to withdraw his financial support from the school if we did not end our
opposition.
42 Id. (footnote omitted).
43 See Luban, supra note 7, at 237 (citing as examples attacks on environmental law
clinics at West Virginia, Wyoming, Pittsburgh, and Tulane law schools).
44 Jamie Smith, Into the Fire: State Legislators Fuel a Heated Debate on Clinical Legal
Education, IN PRACTICE (The Clinical Law Program at the Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law,
Balt. Md.) Spring 2010, at 1, available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/programs
/clinic/documents/ClinicSpring2010.pdf. A massive effort by the American Bar
Association, national legal education associations, and more than 500 individual faculty
members and deans as well as untold letters, e-mails, and phone calls from Maryland Law
School alumni and students reduced the proposed bill to a request for public information
about the environmental law clinic’s cases over the past two years. Id. at 2.
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A similar effort led by Louisiana’s Chemical Association (LCA)45
resulted in the introduction of legislation forbidding law clinics at
public and private law schools that receive state funds from suing
government agencies, individuals, and businesses for damages or
from “raising most constitutional challenges.”46 The legislation would
also have given the legislature oversight over law clinics.47
One obvious explanation for these attacks is that environmental
clinics and their clients frequently adopt anti-development positions
that threaten important established economic and political interests.48
According to Professor Stephen Wizner, “[u]nlike most (all?) other
law school clinics, environmental clinics, by definition, handle only
cases that seek to prevent government or industry from carrying out
projects involving land use, industrial development, and
manufacturing” that endanger not only the environment in some way,
but also where the litigation jeopardizes some established economic
interests.49 The obvious result of challenging “powerful interests or
affect[ing] issues of community or statewide concern,” is that
“controversy becomes almost inescapable.”50
“Empowering individual citizens, or community groups, to stand
up to the powerful forces of government and industry by providing
them with competent legal advocates is political, however one defines
that word.”51 The response to environmental clinics is often also
45 The breathtaking reach of LCA’s campaign against Tulane included urging its
members to: stop their corporate support of Tulane, including matched employee giving
and recruiting; personally contact all of the school’s charitable donors to educate them
about the environmental clinic’s activities; work to reduce or eliminate all state general
appropriation support for Tulane; urge the state Board of Regents to cease any support of
Tulane; and enlist the efforts of the Governor and Louisiana’s congressional delegation in
emphasizing the detrimental impact of Tulane’s environmental clinic’s activities on the
state’s manufacturing jobs. Memorandum from Dan. S. Borne, President, La. Chem.
Ass’n, to the Members of La. Chem. Ass’n (May 7, 2010) [hereinafter LCA
Memorandum] (on file with author).
46 Jordan Blum, Bill Would Ban Law Clinics Suing State, 2THEADVOCATE.COM (May
18, 2010), http://www.2theadvocate.com/news/94030164.html.
47 Id.
48 See Luban, supra note 7, at 237 (saying these positions “put them at odds with
business interests”); id. at 238 (describing how the Western Legal Foundation put an anticlinic attack ad in the New York Times, explaining the reasons for its opposition to law
school clinics).
49 Wizner & Solomon, supra note 12, at 473.
50 Adam Babich, The Apolitical Law School Clinic, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 447, 447
(2005).
51 Wizner & Solomon, supra note 12, at 473 (“If there is any clinic that is inherently
‘political,’ it is an environmental clinic.”). See also Tarr, supra note 7, at 1042
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political. Some state legislatures have restricted the scope of clinical
practice by conditioning the school’s receipt of public funds.52 For
example, a North Dakota state grant program limited the remedies
available in suits brought by clinics against state agencies to
declaratory and injunctive relief, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons
attempted to require “that a grantee could not file suit against the
agency unless the grantee’s attorney first attempted to informally
resolve the matter.”53 Similar restrictions may even be “imposed by
the law school or university to avoid political or funding

(“[A]ccording to the ethics rules in most states, a lawyer’s work with a client is not an
endorsement of that ‘client’s political, economic, social or moral views or activities.’
Nevertheless, law clinics, particularly those associated with public institutions or those
engaged in politically controversial work like environmental law clinics, are the target of
attacks because of the work they do for clients and organizations. As state funding for
public education diminishes, public law schools are functioning more like private
institutions, but the affiliation or identification as a state school continues to create
conflicts for the legal work the clinic might provide.” (footnotes omitted)). Recent
examples of such attacks are those levied against Tulane and the University of Maryland’s
environmental law clinics. See Bill Barrow, Tulane Still Target of Law Clinics Bill,
Though Amendments Could Spare Loyola, Others, NOLA.COM (May 17, 2010, 4:55 PM),
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2010/05/tulane_still_target _of_law_cli.html; Law:
Fight Over Environmental Clinics Moves to La., GREENWIRE (May 11, 2010, 12:53 PM),
http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2010/05/11/14 (describing a bill, supported by the
Louisiana Chemical Association, introduced by a state legislator prohibiting law clinics at
state-funded universities from filing lawsuits against government agencies, seeking money
damages, or making state constitutional claims, which while not explicitly referencing
either Tulane or environmental clinics, “carves out exceptions” for criminal defense,
family law, and domestic violence clinics); Nelson, supra note 2 (describing how a Clean
Water Act lawsuit against Perdue Farms and an 80,000-bird poultry farm triggered the
passage by both houses of the Maryland legislature legislation requiring the environmental
law clinic to turn over to the legislators a breakdown of clients and budgets for the past
two years, stripping from the bill provisions that would have levied a $250,000 fine
against the University if it did not comply); see also id. (discussing how the “political
blowback that Maryland’s [environmental] clinic has encountered” is not an isolated
occurrence: the University of Pittsburgh’s environmental law clinic had to scramble to find
new sources of funding ten years after the state legislature modified the University’s
appropriation to prohibit the clinic from using public money as a result of its involvement
in lawsuits seeking to block timber sales in Pennsylvania’s Allegheny National Forest; the
environmental law clinic at Rutgers University was sued by real estate developers in 2006
after it represented clients opposed to a controversial shopping mall project—the state
Supreme Court eventually sided with the clinic; the University of Oregon’s environmental
law clinic was finally “spun off from the university in 1993” in response to a threat by
state lawmakers—who were egged on by state business organizations, angry over the
clinic’s work on endangered species litigation involving timber sales—to shutter the entire
law school, after more than a decade of sparring with legislators over the clinic’s
continued existence).
52 Kuehn & Joy, Ethics Critique, supra note 8, at 2030.
53 Id. at 2035.
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controversies, or voluntarily imposed by the law clinic as ways to
avoid possible controversies, allocate scarce clinic resources, or
advance educational goals.”54
“Law school clinic directors, therefore, often find themselves
trying to defuse, avoid, embrace, or otherwise manage controversy.”55
Clinics have an ally in the courts, with the notable exception of the
Louisiana Supreme Court. That court “remains the only court that has
responded to clinic critics by restricting the cases and clients that law
clinics may handle.”56 Most courts have generally been protective of
law school clinics and their supervising attorneys and have expanded
student practice rules addressing the cases and clients clinics can take
on.57 Professors Kuehn and Joy note that the refusal of federal courts
to adopt Louisiana’s student practice rule restrictions, as well as
criticism by judges in other states of that state’s Supreme Court’s
actions, “suggest[s] that, contrary to the desire of critics of law school
clinics, Louisiana’s narrow view of the appropriate role of law
schools in providing legal services to needy clients and causes is not
typically shared by other members of the judiciary.”58
B. Tools Used to Attack Law School Environmental Clinics
and Ones That May Be Used in the Future
Those who attack environmental clinics use a variety of tools, such
as cutting off clinic funds or the funds of the parent university,
requiring that clinic cases be pre-approved by internal or external
boards, and arranging that the clinic’s authority to bring certain types
of cases or represent certain types of clients be eliminated or severely
curtailed. Most often, disgruntled economic interests who find
Id. at 2030.
Babich, supra note 50, at 447. Perhaps in response to Tulane’s “bruising battle”
against the state over his clinic’s continued existence, Professor Babich proposes what he
calls the apolitical environmental law clinic that maintains a non-substantive agenda and
focuses on empowering clients while still offering pedagogical advantages and services to
Tulane’s “diverse constituencies.” Id. at 450–51. But see Wizner & Solomon, supra note
12, at 474 (disagreeing with Babich that an environmental clinic can ever be apolitical
because they “are inherently ‘political,’ that is, they are designed to empower those
without power to assert their interests in opposition to the competing interests of the rich
and powerful”).
56 Kuehn & Joy, Ethics Critique, supra note 8, at 1991.
57 Id. But see id. at 1976 n.13 (reporting on actions of Michigan juvenile court judges in
denying court appointments to Michigan Law School’s child Advocacy Clinic, as an
example of at least one court expressing its “displeasure with a clinic’s policies or
litigation strategies”).
58 Id. at 1991–92.
54
55
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themselves as defendants in clinic lawsuits—such as the chemical
industry in Louisiana or the poultry industry in Maryland—are behind
such initiatives.
As noted previously, state law schools are particularly vulnerable
to the withdrawal of public funding. Private schools who “are
dominated by private bar ‘benefactors’ and boards of trustees” and
state-funded law schools that rely on private fundraising to
supplement their public revenue are also susceptible to threats of
funding withdrawal by individuals.59 “Soft money and grants are
another source of unwarranted interference in the work of clinics. . . .
Law school clinics no longer rely heavily on federal grants, but may
still receive state, local, or foundation money [that donors can
condition in ways] that constrains the ability of the lawyers in the
clinic to represent clients fully.”60 Such threats can have a serious
chilling effect on a vulnerable clinic’s practice.
Law schools have diverse constituencies, and while they may share
common educational and professional goals, they may not share
“substantive philosophies,” especially concerning how conflicts
between commercial development and environmental protection
should be resolved.61 “[N]o one likes to be sued,” and this fact can
create obdurate enemies for the clinic even among those who support
the idea of clinical education in the abstract.62 This reality may
dampen the enthusiasm of clinical directors to campaign against those
who criticize their work, since “[t]he same people dedicated to delawyering your clients may be potential or current supporters of your
institution.”63 Schools that adopt policies or procedures that limit a
clinic’s choice of cases, clients, potential defendants, or court-ordered
remedies, such as seeking an award of attorneys’ fees against a state
agency, are generally undertaking such initiatives “to shield the

Ashar, supra note 13, at 413.
Tarr, supra note 7, at 1043.
61 Babich, supra note 50, at 460 (noting how law schools such as Tulane have “a
constituency as diverse as the legal profession itself” resulting in the varying views of
Tulane and its supporters about how to reconcile the conflict between “commerce and
environmental protection, [which] are presumably all over the map”).
62 Id. at 468 (“[S]ome law-school constituents may never become clinic supporters, just
as some academic research may be unpopular with some constituents.”).
63 Id. (explaining the reluctance of clinicians “to treat their critics as enemies”).
59
60
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university from criticism by politicians and possible threats to state
funding.”64
Sometimes clinic opponents are graduates of the law school or the
parent university.
Alumni are major constituents of most law schools and can apply
both positive and negative pressures involving law clinics. As
donors, they can financially support clinics but may insist on a
particular political bent or content . . . . They may also put financial
pressure on law school deans to eliminate a clinic that the donor
perceives to be inconsistent with a particular perspective.65

Alumni are also potential employers of students, and irritating them
may economically disadvantage students. This fact can be especially
problematic for students in a tight job market,66 such as the one
currently facing law school graduates.67 This may lead students who
are dependent on particular alumni networks for assistance in finding
a job to avoid participating in a clinic that has drawn that alumnus’
ire.68 To the extent that “the desires and preferences of law students
and law professors . . . are shaped by dominant market forces,” and
when those forces oppose what a clinic is doing, the internal support
for the clinic can be subtlety affected within the law school.69
An extreme litigation tool used by defendants in environmental
lawsuits, although not yet to my knowledge against any
environmental clinic, is the strategic lawsuit against public
participation, or SLAPP suits as they are commonly known.70 It is
worth spending a moment on this type of litigation because there is
every reason to think that those who try to intimidate law clinics from
64 Kuehn & Joy, Lawyering in the Academy, supra note 3, at 115. See also id. at 116
(“[Direct d]ecanal control over individual case selection is usually motivated by a desire to
avoid bad publicity or outside attacks on the school.”).
65 Tarr, supra note 7, at 1042 (footnote omitted).
66 See id. (“Alumni are potential employers for the students and have sometimes been
useful in supporting efforts to expand professional training in the school, but their
perception of what is needed may not coincide with the clinic faculty’s opinions.”).
67 See, e.g., Katy Hopkins, Law Jobs Will Be Harder to Come By, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (June 25, 2010), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-law-schools/articles
/2010/06/25/law-jobs-will-be-harder-to-come-by.html.
68 See Tarr, supra note 7, at 1042 (“Students rely heavily on alumni networks when job
hunting, and if alumni are unhappy about a clinic, students may shy away from
participating.”).
69 Ashar, supra note 13, at 413 (footnote omitted).
70 See Luban, supra note 7, at 219 (describing SLAPP suits as a “[l]ess familiar, but
equally important, . . . adversarial attempt to exclude voices rather than information from
the process”).
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initiating certain types of actions in court will eventually start using
them against clinic clients.
SLAPP suits, like clinic harassment campaigns, are intended to
frighten into silence those who threaten established economic
interests. Both seek to stop citizens from engaging in processes that
protect their interests and both engage in “abusive” practices. SLAPP
suits, like anti-clinic campaigns, impose a heavy cost not only on their
target, but also on society by preventing individuals from
participating in “government programs that rely on citizen input to
perform their functions” and by delaying “solutions to the problems
that gave rise to the lawsuits.”71
“SLAPP suits typically pose as common tort actions such as
defamation, interference with a contract, restraint of trade, conspiracy,
due process violations, and even abuse of process or malicious
prosecution claims.”72 Not surprisingly, among the areas of law
drawing the most attention by SLAPP plaintiffs are real estate
development, zoning, and environmental law.73 Not in My Backyard
(popularly known as NIMBY) suits are another common form of
SLAPP suit, often involving wilderness, pollution, and animal rights
issues, and targeting groups such as “The Sierra Club, eco-activists,
and land trusts.”74 These suits transform what are essentially political
disputes into legal ones by alleging “some technical legal injury,”
taking “the debate out of the public forum and into a judicial forum,
where only the technicalities of the legal injury can be addressed,
instead of the underlying problem’s political implications.”75 In a
SLAPP suit, “the focus is shifted away from the citizen’s claimed
injury and onto the filer’s alleged injury. These transformations all

71 P. Caleb Patterson, Comment, Have I Been SLAPPed? Arkansas’s Attempt to Curb
Abusive Litigation: The Citizen Participation in Government Act, 60 ARK. L. REV. 507,
508 (2007).
72 Id. at 511–12; see also id. (“All of these are attempts to tack legal consequences onto
what is, at its core, a wholly lawful exercise of the citizen’s petition rights.”); see also id.
at 507 (“Abusive litigation is a tactic used to punish citizens who exercise their right to
petition in our democracy.”).
73 Id. at 512, 526 (listing other SLAPP targets as including consumer rights, animal
rights, public officials, civil rights, and neighborhood problems, among others; “[r]eal
estate SLAPPs are the largest category of abusive litigation suits, comprising a full onethird of all such suits filed.”).
74 Id. at 528 (footnotes omitted).
75 Id. at 510–11.
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serve the filer’s ultimate interest of silencing debate on the original
political issue.”76
Even though, according to Professor Luban, eighty percent of
SLAPP suits are dismissed before trial, this does not matter—their
“aim is not legal victory but intimidation.”77 SLAPP suit
“[d]efendants facing ruinous legal bills and the risk of substantial
personal liability agree to cease protest activities in return for having
the SLAPP suit dropped.”78 These liabilities effectively compel
SLAPP suit defendants to drop any legal initiative they had taken
against the SLAPP suit plaintiff. One estimate is that since the 1970s
Id. at 511 (footnote omitted).
Luban, supra note 7, at 219. See also Patterson, supra note 71, at 507–08 (noting the
actual goal of these suits is not a “win in court,” but to “intimidate and harass political
critics into silence . . . .”); id. at 512 (“A SLAPP filer never really intends to win the
lawsuit on its merits; his goal is to drag the litigation out as long as possible and force the
target to focus what resources she may have on defending the suit.” (footnote omitted)).
Another tool used by defendants to frighten public interest plaintiffs into dropping their
lawsuits is Rule 68. See generally Jenny R. Rubin, Note, Rule 68: A Red Herring in
Environmental Citizen Suits, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 849, 852 (1999) (“[Under Rule
68,] defendants may make an offer of judgment anytime [sic] after receiving a complaint.
Invoking Rule 68 shortly after the case is filed ensures that most of the defendant’s
attorneys’ fees will be recoverable from the plaintiff if the plaintiff prevails but is awarded
less than provided for in the offer.”); id. at 853 (“[T]o the extent that Rule 68 discourages
citizen suit enforcement of environmental laws, the Rule prevents implementation of the
environmental protection scheme envisioned by Congress. . . . [Since] most environmental
statutes include attorneys’ fees in their definition of costs, [this makes a public interest]
plaintiff who rejects an offer of judgment potentially liable for the defendant’s post-offer
attorneys’ fees.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 852 (“Because many federal statutes
promoting public interest litigation do define attorneys’ fees [including defendants’
attorneys’ fees] as recoverable costs, Rule 68 has become a powerful inducement to
settlement in public interest litigation.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 853–54 (“[Since public
interest plaintiffs] have limited funds, the ability of defendants to recover attorneys’ fees
shifts the balance of power in settlement negotiations in favor of defendants. Because
accepting an offer of judgment is the only certain means of avoiding liability for the
defendant’s fees and costs, plaintiffs claim that they are coerced into accepting
unfavorable settlements.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 852–53 (“First, these offers present
the threat of a large assessment of costs against the plaintiff, which the plaintiff is
guaranteed to avoid only by accepting the offer. Second, at the early stages of litigation, it
is extremely difficult for the plaintiff to adequately assess an offer of judgment and weigh
the inherent risks of accepting or rejecting it. Finally, since many public interest suits seek
injunctive relief, the undeveloped information available early in litigation makes it hard for
plaintiffs to evaluate whether an offer consisting only of monetary relief is acceptable.”
(footnotes omitted)). According to Rubin, “the risk of liability for the defendant’s postoffer costs is the main obstacle to vigorous citizen suit prosecution[,]” and “prevents
citizen plaintiffs from fully litigating their claims, even though such process is a
substantive right under federal environmental law. Thus, the risk of having to pay such
fees presents a significant deterrent to effective citizen suit litigation.” Id. at 853–54.
78 Luban, supra note 7, at 219.
76
77
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when these lawsuits started to be filed, “thousands of citizens have
been directly sued and thousands more have been frightened into
silence by the threat of such suits.”79 In this regard, SLAPP suits and
the attacks on environmental clinics share a common goal—drive the
environmental plaintiffs out of court and eliminate their ability to sue.
C. Some Effects of These Attacks
Although the risk of personal liability may be less for clinical
directors and clinical students than defendants in a SLAPP suit,
nonetheless anti-clinic campaigns have been effective in curtailing
clinic activities in some instances.80 Even when an attack fails, they
are frequently “near misses,” and because “eventually some will
succeed[,]”81 the fear of such an attack can have a chilling effect on
environmental clinics at other schools. When these attacks result in
the imposition of restrictions on the cases and clients a clinic can take,
they “do not simply drive the needy client to another lawyer outside
the law school but deny legal assistance altogether.”82 They may also
create ethical dilemmas for clinicians and academic freedom issues
for the parent law school.
One indirect effect of publicized attacks on environmental clinics
has been to dissuade similar clinics at other schools from taking on
controversial cases or clients “because of fears that taking such cases
could result in threats to their continued operation.”83 For example,
after the first attack on Tulane’s environmental law clinic, several law
schools took proactive prophylactic measures to curtail the activities
of their environmental clinics to protect against the same thing
happening to them.84 Even without taking such steps, environmental
Patterson, supra note 71, at 508.
See Luban, supra note 7, at 240 (“Obviously, the degree to which clinicians selfcensor cannot be known, but . . . self-censorship exists. In effect, the assaults on
environmental-law clinics function like SLAPP suits, intimidating law school
administrators and clinic directors even when they fail.”).
81 Id.
82 Kuehn & Joy, Ethics Critique, supra note 8, at 2023.
83 Id. at 1989. See also id. at 1989 nn.87–88 (documenting complaints to law school
deans from prominent alumni and state legislators).
84 See Kuehn & Joy, Lawyering in the Academy, supra note 3, at 100 (“A 2005 survey
of law clinic teachers found that one-third ‘worried’ about the reaction of the law faculty
or administration to their clinic casework. Seventeen percent of clinic faculty reported
making changes in their case selection choices because of those worries, and more than ten
percent reported making significant or major changes. In a more recent survey of clinical
faculty, fifteen percent of clinical teachers reported that the clinical program director had
suggested they avoid a particular case. Nine percent of teachers stated that their law school
79
80
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clinicians may wisely “hesitate before taking on volatile cases that
may provoke dangerous backlash against the[ir] clinics or their law
schools,”85 thus depriving an otherwise deserving client of judicial
redress.
Attacks on environmental clinics and attempts to interfere with
their relationship with their clients can create ethical problems for
clinical directors. Schools that give themselves the authority “to
scrutinize case selection and assume that they have a ‘right’ to
intervene” run the risk of interfering with the attorney-client
relationship that clinical directors have with their clients.86 This
interference creates a professional responsibility problem for clinical
directors who, because they are lawyers, cannot ethically “permit a
person who provides compensation or employment, be it a dean,
university president or trustee, to interfere with, direct, or regulate
that lawyer’s independent professional judgment or otherwise
interfere with the client-lawyer relationship.”87 Even when there is no
direct interference by a third party, such as by an important alumnus
or a member of the law school’s administration or by the university’s
board of trustees, it still may be naive for a clinical director—who is,
after all, a faculty member—to think that “her professional judgment
may not be impaired by litigating against a member of the university
or law school governing body or influential donor.”88 Large donors
dean had made the same suggestion, and seven percent responded that on their own
initiative they had avoided a case because they suspected the dean would prefer they did
so.” (footnotes omitted)).
85 Luban, supra note 7, at 240.
86 Tarr, supra note 7, at 1031 (noting that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(MRPC), specifically MRPC 5.4 cmt. 2 (2008), explicitly prohibit a third party from
directing or regulating the lawyer’s professional judgment in rendering legal services). The
way to avoid this happening in the case of clinics that rely on the law school, donations,
grants, or other sources of outside funding is to “develop and highlight policies that clarify
that outside-funding sources cannot dictate the lawyer’s actions.” Id. at 1037 (citing
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4, R. 1.7 cmt. 13, R. 1.8 cmts. 11, 12 (2008));
see also id. at 1041 (stating that “lawyers are generally free to accept or reject clients,”
while third parties may not interfere with the attorney’s relationship with her client).
87 Kuehn & Joy, Lawyering in the Academy, supra note 3, at 112 (“The lawyer’s
obligation to a client is not modified by a third-party’s employment of the lawyer.” Id.).
But see Ashar, supra note 13, at 386 (“The professional responsibility rules explicitly
prohibit the influence of third parties in a representation. Because associational standing in
litigation has limited reach, the rules channel members of collectives into relationships of
individual representation by lawyers. These relationships and the rules then potentially cut
these individuals off from the organizations and the resistance strategies through which
they have gotten involved in the social conflict from which the legal action stems.”
(footnotes omitted)).
88 Kuehn & Joy, Lawyering in the Academy, supra note 3, at 113.
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“may have substantial influence with the university president or law
school dean,” while administrators control the terms of the faculty
member’s employment.89 This may be particularly true for untenured
junior clinical directors or those who do not have “presumptively
renewable long-term contracts [and] may be particularly cautious
about taking on any potentially controversial matter.”90 These kinds
of subtle pressures on clinical directors can create problematic ethical
situations where a conflict between their self-interest and that of their
clients is just below the waterline.91
These review initiatives run afoul of another ethical constraint on
clinicians, namely the prohibition against sharing a client’s
confidential information with another individual.92
While this principle may not prevent outside influences on clinic
decisions, it at least means that, in the absence of client consent,
professors may only provide outsiders limited information about
their cases. Therefore, when a university official or law school dean
seeks to influence a faculty member’s representation of a client,
they may be acting on incomplete information.93

Additionally, attacks on law clinics that have a “reasonable
likelihood of preventing certain persons or causes from obtaining
legal representation or of interfering with a clinic lawyer’s
independent professional judgment, . . . may constitute actions
prejudicial to the administration of justice[,]” and thus run afoul of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.94 According to Professors
Kuehn and Joy, such attacks
intended to deny or delay clients access to clinic representation or to
induce a clinic attorney to render less than independent professional
representation would lack a substantial purpose other than to
embarrass, delay, or burden the clinic attorney or her client.
Id.
Id.
91 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (2010). See, e.g., id. at R. 1.8(f)(2) (“A
lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the
client unless . . . there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional
judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship . . . .”).
92 See Kuehn & Joy, Lawyering in the Academy, supra note 3, at 111 (“Unless sharing
the information with a dean or other official outside the course advances the client’s
interests, the professor-attorney must protect confidential client information.”).
93 Id. at 111–12.
94 Kuehn & Joy, Ethics Critique, supra note 8, at 2025. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 5 (“Legal representation should not be denied to people who
are unable to afford legal services, or whose cause is controversial or the subject of
popular disapproval.”).
89
90
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Because such efforts are prohibited by imperative rules of
professional conduct, they could constitute misconduct under the
Model Rules or Model Code [if the attacking party is a lawyer].95

Those in the academy who allow attacks on law school clinics to
interfere with the clinic’s administration can run afoul of principles of
academic freedom.96 Professors Kuehn and Joy believe that “efforts to
avoid controversy or appease certain influential persons or groups
infringe on both the faculty’s collective right to establish educational
policies and undermine the academic freedom of the individual
professor to choose the most appropriate and effective means to
educate students.”97 The Association of American Law Schools’
(AALS) submission to the Louisiana Supreme Court echoed this
concern in its defense of Tulane’s environmental law clinic; AALS
advocated that applying the factors courts consider when legal
questions arise about particular course materials or teaching methods
clearly shows that Tulane’s clinical instructors “have a First
Amendment right to select cases as their course materials for their
clinics.”98 Law schools hire clinical instructors to teach students
lawyering skills and professional values through the representation of
actual clients. According to the AALS, “[o]nce these teachers have
been hired for that purpose, they must have the right, like any other
law professor, to choose the materials which in their opinion are best
suited to performing their objective.”99 Any interference in that

95 Kuehn & Joy, Ethics Critique, supra note 8, at 2029 (footnote omitted). Professor
Sameer Ashar recounts a story told by William Simon, that illustrates how the MRPC can
be used against progressive lawyers, about how southern bar associations accused NAACP
lawyers of having conflicts of interests between their group and individual clients during
their national desegregation campaign and how, according to Simon, this represented an
“almost-fetishistic attachment of the guardians of the profession to individualistic lawyerclient relationships,” which they then used “to preserve the status quo and prevent
movements from using law.” Ashar, supra note 13, at 387 n.126.
96 See also Kuehn & Joy, Lawyering in the Academy, supra note 3, at 102 (“Decisions
about which matter to undertake or strategy to pursue may affect not only student learning
and the client’s interests but also the interests of the university and, in public universities,
the state.”).
97 Id. at 115.
98 deNeve et al., supra note 10, at 557 (identifying these screening factors as including
“whether the teaching materials and methods are appropriate to their instructive purpose;
whether the materials and methods are appropriate to the relevant educational standards
being used at the particular educational level; and whether the materials and methods are
appropriate to the professional standards of educators in the particular field.” Id. (citations
omitted)).
99 Id. at 558.
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choice, whether by the Louisiana bar or business interests,
“impinge[s] on the academic freedom of law teachers.”100
Attacks such as those on environmental clinics, which focus on
“taking out the adversary” through attacking her lawyer, are
impoverishing the adversarial system.101 Professor Luban takes
particular note of what he calls “[s]ilencing doctrines[, which] include
statutes, rules, and judicial decisions that allow opponents to attack
the funding or restrict the activity of their adversaries’ advocates.”102
He argues that “targeting advocates for the other side rather than
arguing against them on the merits⎯robs the adversary system of its
strongest claim to legitimacy,”103 and leaves a system with only one
adversary that is adversarial “in name alone.”104 “When judges and
legislatures create doctrines that enable well-funded parties to take
out the other side’s lawyer, they undermine basic fairness and turn the
adversary system into a system of procedural injustice.”105
Regardless of the ethical, academic freedom, or systemic problems
that attacks on environmental clinics may generate, the fact that these
attacks may inhibit the activities of vulnerable clinics means that in
all likelihood they will continue.106
Moreover, the breadth of clinical programs that have been attacked
demonstrates that no law clinic program is immune from such
assaults. Any law school clinic is just one controversial case, one
unpopular client, one angry legislator, alumnus or opposing
attorney, or one unsupportive dean or university official away from
attempts to interfere in its case and client selection.107

Id.
Luban, supra note 7, at 213.
102 Id. at 220. Expanding this thought further, Professor Luban quotes Felix Cohen’s
coinage of the phrase “‘transcendental nonsense’ to describe issues that look like
legitimate legal inquiries but in fact employ contentless abstractions that cannot be given
content without arguing in a circle. [But u]nfortunately, in law, metaphysical questions
invite political answers: the gut fills in the blanks, and judges forced to decide the question
reach whatever result they find congenial.” Id. at 230 (footnote omitted).
103 Id. at 213.
104 Id. at 219.
105 Id. at 219–20.
106 See Kuehn & Joy, Ethics Critique, supra note 8, at 1992 (“[G]iven the frequency
and severity of [these] attacks . . . over [nearly] two decades, outside efforts to influence a
clinic supervisor’s case and client selection are likely to continue in one form or
another.”).
107 Id.
100
101
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With this understanding in mind, this Article now turns to the reasons
why clinics, especially environmental clinics, draw so much
opposition and why those reasons have not abated over time.
III
SOME UNCONVENTIONAL REASONS
WHY CLINICS ARE PERSISTENTLY ATTACKED
The common reasons given for why environmental clinics are
attacked are the success that these clinics have had in the courts, the
types of clients they represent, and the economic interests they
target.108 However, this Article suggests those explanations are not
sufficiently robust, and puts forward two additional reasons; namely,
that these attacks feed on the hardening hostility that the judicial
branch feels toward granting certain types of citizens access to the
courts, and the growing incivility of the legal profession. This
incivility manifests itself in bullying behavior by lawyers and their
clients, and feeds off the comparative economic insecurity of law
students and clinic directors, which makes them more vulnerable to
intimidation than larger, national environmental organizations.109
Since the more conventional reasons for why clinics are attacked have
been well covered,110 Part III of this Article focuses on these two
novel explanations for why environmental clinics are in the crosshairs of angry economic interest groups, concluding that both factors
play a role in the current hostility toward clinics and are not easily
abated.
A. Part and Parcel of Judicial Hostility
Toward “Citizen” Access to the Courts
Suits by citizens authorized under various federal laws such as the
Clean Water Act111 or Endangered Species Act,112 or more generally
under the Administrative Procedure Act,113 have brought hordes of
complainants into federal court objecting to the behavior of
government agencies and the activities of private entities that violate
See supra Part II (discussing some of these reasons).
This second explanation owes much to the psychological literature on the behavior
of bullies.
110 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (listing some of these articles).
111 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006).
112 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006).
113 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
108
109
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these laws. Congress enacted these provisions granting citizens access
to the courts to provide additional foot soldiers in the campaign to
arrest and abate environmental degradation114 out of a somewhat
cynical recognition that the federal or state government itself might be
engaged in wrongful conduct.115 Because agencies are necessarily
constrained by their budgets—and sometimes by political
considerations—suits by ordinary citizens were intended to fill a void
114 See Marisa L. Ugalde, The Future of Environmental Citizen Suits After Buckhannon
Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 8
ENVTL. LAW. 589, 594 (2001) (“Government agencies lack effective enforcement
capabilities because they are short on resources, possess limited information, and are
subject to political pressure. Moreover, the agency itself may be in violation of a
regulation, or a special interest group that is closely aligned with the agency may be
engaged in the wrongful conduct. In such situations the agency may be hesitant to bring an
enforcement action.” (footnotes omitted)). See also Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver:
Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental Protection, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F.
39, 43 (2001) (“[T]he citizen-suit device is ‘a mechanism for controlling unlawfully
inadequate enforcement of the law.’” (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After
Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 165 (1992)));
James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10
WIDENER L. REV. 1, 5–7 (2003) (discussing the virtues of citizen suits, as they “force rule
of law and compliance with national environmental protection objectives”; “hold
unelected governmental agencies accountable [thereby motivating] governmental agencies
charged with the responsibility to bring enforcement and abatement proceedings”; “help
uphold bicameral lawmaking and tripartite governance and help effectuate often
inscrutable congressional objectives . . . . They stem directly from the core of a
representation reinforcing democracy”; “help assure laws enacted by Congress, . . . are
‘faithfully execute[d]’ by the Executive, with ‘[c]ontroversies’ resolved by a Judiciary”;
and citizen suit authority “enhances public participation, helps educate law students,
shapes public opinion, and encourages responsible environmental stewardship here and
elsewhere, regardless of moral reference” (fourth and fifth alterations in original)
(footnotes omitted)); Will Reisinger et al., Environmental Enforcement and the Limits of
Cooperative Federalism: Will Courts Allow Citizen Suits to Pick Up the Slack?, 20 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 61 (2010) (“[Citizen suit] provisions act as an insurance policy,
as a way to ensure that environmental laws can be enforced even when state and federal
governments fail to do so.”); Lucia A. Silecchia, The Catalyst Calamity: Post-Buckhannon
Fee-Shifting in Environmental Litigation and a Proposal for Congressional Action, 29
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (2004) (“Acknowledging the importance of citizen suits in
giving teeth to environmental laws, and recognizing the often prohibitive costs of such
litigation, Congress also included fee-shifting provisions in most environmental citizen
suit statutes. These fee-shifting provisions change the so-called ‘American rule’ for
attorney fees by allowing victorious citizen plaintiffs to recover their attorney fees from
the losing party.” (footnote omitted)); Cassandra Stubbs, Is the Environmental Citizen Suit
Dead? An Examination of the Erosion of Standards of Justiciability for Environmental
Citizen Suits, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 77, 79 (2000) (“Citizen suits were an
attractive solution to the problem created by the discrepancy between sweeping
environmental laws and limited agency capacity for enforcement.”).
115 See Adler, supra note 114, at 44 (“Citizen suits also can operate to prevent political
considerations within the executive department from limiting enforcement activities.”).
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in the agencies’ ability to implement environmental laws.116 Many of
the rationales supporting citizen suits also apply to the need for
citizen participation in agency decision-making.117
On the other hand, those who object to anything that opens the
doors of the court to these types of lawsuits, or object to anything that
encourages public participation in agency decision making, complain
that these initiatives interfere with the ordinary workings of
government—including the government’s prerogative of choosing
how it will spend its enforcement resources.118 These same critics
116 See Ugalde, supra note 114, at 612 (“[C]itizen suits fill a necessary void in the
agencies’ ability to fulfill their role in regulation of environmental legislation.”); see also
Adler, supra note 114, at 43–44 (“Allowing for citizen suits theoretically fills the void [left
by inadequate government resources] by deputizing countless private citizens and activist
groups to act as private attorneys general without any public oversight. Centralized
regulatory agencies are further limited in their ability to provide optimal enforcement of
environmental regulations because they have limited information. The environmental
impact of various activities will vary from place to place, and local knowledge and
expertise is necessary to identify those environmental impacts which are of greatest
concern. This sort of location-specific information is inherently beyond the reach of
centralized regulatory agencies. Local citizen groups, on the other hand, may be in a better
position to observe these effects and act accordingly.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 44
(endorsing the role of citizen suits in “see[ing] that important legislative purposes heralded
in the halls of Congress are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal
bureaucracy.” (quoting Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy
Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971))); Robert L. Glicksman & Matthew R.
Batzel, Science, Politics, Law, and the Arc of the Clean Water Act: The Role of
Assumptions in the Adoption of a Pollution Control Landmark, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
99, 127 (2010) (citing S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 79 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3668, 3747) (acknowledging the “public service” citizens suits performed).
117 See Mihaly, supra note 15, at 160 (“Yet . . . insider staff and officials frequently
need outsider citizen input to make them wise. . . . [I]n part because staff members are not
privy to all information, and . . . good partnerships among citizens, experts and advocates
can provide valuable new data and analysis. . . . [E]specially . . . in regimes where elected
officials have values antithetic to good science and priorities heavily weighted towards the
expressed positions of economically dominant stakeholders. In such environments, expert
staff members are pressured to select among facts and approaches to reach predetermined
conclusions.”). See also H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 134 (1972), quoted in Glicksman &
Batzel, supra note 116, at 127 (explaining the role of citizen suits to enable plaintiffs to act
as private attorneys general and noting that they “provide[d] an open door for those who
have legitimate interests in the courts, and encourages more meaningful participation in
the administrative processes.”).
118 Ugalde, supra note 114, at 612 n.145 (“[A]rguing that citizen groups seriously
interfere with effective government regulatory action because the initiation of citizen suits
removes the threat of an enforcement action, which is the principal coercive mechanism
available to regulators[.]” Id. (citing Robert D. Snook, Environmental Citizen Suits and
Judicial Interpretation: First Time Tragedy, Second Time Farce, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
311, 312–13 (1998))); see also id. (“[T]he initiation of citizen suits may result in overenforcement of the law, diverting too many agency resources from other uses.” (citing
A.H. Barnett & Timothy D. Terrell, Economic Observations on Citizen Suit Provisions of
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contend that citizen suits are often filed for the tangential purpose of
gaining publicity,119 and can have negative unintended effects.120
Professor Jonathan Adler takes on the fundamental premise
underlying citizen suits that increasing the capacity of the government
to enforce laws through citizen suits is a “good,” saying:
Insofar as the environmental regulatory scheme is ill-equipped to
address given environmental concerns, increasing the stringency of
enforcement will do little, if anything, to advance ecological values.
Insofar as detailed and complex regulatory provisions provide
opportunities for special-interest rent-seeking, citizen suits can
facilitate further exploitation outside of the legislative arena. Insofar
as existing environmental programs embody mistaken priorities,
citizen suits can amplify the improper emphases. And insofar as the
existing regulatory regime is too rigid to allow for environmentally
beneficial innovation, citizen suits threaten to ossify the process
even more.121

He notes that while citizen suits allegedly address “free rider
problems and the high costs of collective political action,” they do not

Environmental Legislation, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 (2001))); Adler, supra note
114, at 62 (“Optimal enforcement is nearly always less than complete enforcement. At
some point, devoting resources to additional prosecutions will produce diminishing
marginal returns. This is particularly true where, as in the environmental context, many
violators have technically broken the law but have not caused any measurable harm.”); id.
at 64 (“By increasing the potential costs associated with facility siting and upgrade, overenforcement can forestall the environmental improvement that results from technological
advance and economic development. . . . In addition, excessive enforcement of existing
environmental rules can create perverse incentives to take ‘preventative’ action that
actually entails the destruction or degradation of environmental resources.”).
119 See Ugalde, supra note 114, at 609 (“Citizen groups are often motivated by factors
other than simply claiming victory, such as the political, media-related, and symbolic
ramifications of litigation. The initiation of a lawsuit may be a strategic decision intended
to garner publicity and to prompt political or agency action in a situation where the
adjudication process would be unsuccessful.”).
120 See May, supra note 114, at 22 (“Citizen enforcement suits also have the unintended
dual effects offering the concurrent negative incentives for agencies (usually states) to roll
back permit requirements [anti backsliding], and for polluters to race into the awaiting
arms of regulators to negotiate judicial settlements to preclude citizen enforcement.”).
Many of these same complaints are made against public participation in agency decision
making. See Mihaly, supra note 15, at 160 (“Modern commentators have argued that
public participation interferes with [government] expertise. Such public involvement, they
contend, can be counterproductive to the operation of good government, especially in the
environmental arena where, for example, lay perceptions of hazardous risk contravene
good science, and repeated citizen litigations distorts EPA’s priorities.” (footnote
omitted)).
121 Adler, supra note 114, at 57–58.
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work that way.122 The individuals or groups who bring these suits are
neither “public-spirited activists” concerned about local
environmental problems nor “altruists.”123 In fact, “national advocacy
groups file the lion’s share of suits,” and the majority of them “are
filed against the least significant sources.”124 The result:
By removing any need for the consideration of actual environmental
impacts, and driving down the costs of establishing defendant
liability, the citizen-suit provisions encourage the filing of suits
against vulnerable plaintiffs, irrespective of the environmental
benefit [while] the prospect of large fines further facilitates rent
extraction, through private settlements, again with little need to
consider the environmental results.125

According to Professor Adler, “[c]itizen-suit provisions create
incentives for environmentalist plaintiffs to pursue their self-interest,
in the form of settlements, remediation projects, and attorneys’ fees,
or to pursue symbolic victories with other value.”126 When the courts’
standing jurisprudence does not require that plaintiffs “have an actual
environmental stake in the case at hand, there is little to prevent
private plaintiffs from using citizen-suit provisions as a means of
pursuing other agendas—from NIMBY opposition to development to
economic rent-seeking or organizational empire-building.”127

122 Id. at 45 (quoting Brief Amicus Curiae of Americans for the Environment in support
of Petitioners at 1–2, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv. (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167 (2000) (No. 98-822), 1999 WL 311758 at *1–*2) (“‘It is a commonplace
observation that the diffuse nature of environmental harms makes environmental interests
relatively difficult to organize into an effective political force.’ . . . [T]hat ‘as a result of
free rider problems and the high costs of collective political action, effective expression of
the broad public interest in environmental protection faces major obstacles in the
American political system.’ Citizen-suit provisions address this concern by enabling a
small group of individuals to enforce environmental regulations directly without any
concern for political constraints.” (footnotes omitted)).
123 Id.
124 Id. at 51.
125 Id. See also id. at 57 (“[C]itizen suit[s are] probably best understood as a Band-Aid
superimposed on a system that can meet with only mixed success.” (quoting Cass R.
Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91
MICH. L. REV. 163, 165 (1992))); id. at 58 (criticizing citizen suits for “facilitat[ing] and
encourag[ing] litigation over paperwork violations and permit exceedences, which may or
may not impact environmental quality” and for failing to “provide any incentive to ferret
out new and undetected violations. Why bother investigating potential environmental harm
when a technical violation is sufficient to support summary judgment?” (footnote
omitted)).
126 Id. at 58.
127 Id. at 61.
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Many of these themes have found their way into the rhetorical
statements of clinic opponents.128 They also find resonance in the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence erecting barriers to citizen access to
the courts to protest environmental harm.129 This jurisprudence has
provided clinic opponents with a barrage of challenges to clinic
lawsuits.
The Court has exhibited increasing hostility toward environmental
lawsuits brought by individual citizens or citizen groups.130 Courts
frequently raise both constitutional and prudential barriers against
environmentalist plaintiffs and have made it increasingly difficult for
prevailing plaintiffs to earn attorneys’ fees,131 despite the enactment
128 See, e.g., LCA Memorandum, supra note 45 (“The LCA Board of Directors voted to
actively engage the clinic by targeting Tulane itself, which gives cover to its out-of-state,
student want-to-be lawyers and their job killing lawsuits.” “Lawsuits filed by one of the
law clinics have cost the state thousands of jobs and untold millions of dollars in tax
revenues.” “What is consistent about TELC’s [Tulane Environmental Law Clinic]
activities is a wanton disregard for the economic well being of the state. Louisiana’s
business community has been targeted in a number of ways . . . .” “[When] the attack has
centered on DEQ, the permitting time has been extended so that companies look elsewhere
to make investments that must hit the window of economic opportunity squarely in order
to clear return-on-investment hurdles. Tulane has learned very well that the power to delay
permits is the power to destroy projects.”).
129 See generally Hope M. Babcock, The Problem with Particularized Injury: The
Disjuncture Between Broad-Based Environmental Harm and Standing Jurisprudence, 25
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Babcock, Problem with Particularized
Injury] (discussing jurisprudential barriers, particularly standing, to environmental
lawsuits). See also Stubbs, supra note 114, at 79–81 (discussing the political origins of
environmental citizen suits in the early 1980s in response to the Reagan administration’s
failure to enforce environmental laws).
130 See May, supra note 114, at 4 (“Examining case development reveals citizen suits
are more challenging to litigate than ever. Challenges abound, including statutory and
common law preclusion, constitutional challenges such as standing, mootness, sovereign
immunity and separation of powers, and remedies and attorney fees . . . .”); see also
Stubbs, supra note 114, at 81–83 (noting that the Court was initially very “generous”
toward environmental cases brought under the Administrative Procedure Act, which “were
decided in a context of judicial support for expansion of access to the courts for the
purpose of enforcing public law” but that this “initial period of expansive interpretation of
standing and jurisdiction for environmental and administrative review did not last. Over
the past ten years, critics have accused the courts of instigating a ‘backlash,’ a ‘severe
blow to environmental activism,’ and a ‘slash and burn expedition through the law of
environmental standing.’” (footnotes omitted)).
131 See, e.g., Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. 2521 (2010) (holding that attorneys’ fees
belong to the client, not the attorney); Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662
(2010) (limiting the use of lodestar calculations to enhance an attorney fee award to
extraordinary circumstances); Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 2149,
2158 (2010) (involving the Retirement Security Act, in which the Court allowed litigants
to recover fees even when they are not prevailing parties if they achieve “some degree of
success on the merits” beyond the “trivial” or a “purely procedural victor[y]” (alteration in
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by Congress of 150 fee-shifting statutes.132 Professor Jim May notes
that “[c]ase law demonstrates, if nothing else, that statutory
shortcomings coupled with judicial ambivalence make for tough
sledding for environmental citizen suit enthusiasts.”133
The Court’s constitutional and prudential jurisdictional hurdles,
especially the standing doctrine, have fundamentally altered the
citizen suit. 134 “Today the environmental citizen plaintiff must have
original) (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 688, 694 (1983));
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S.
598 (2001) (eliminating the use of the catalyst theory as a basis for awarding fees under
the Fair Housing Act and the American with Disabilities Act); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club,
463 U.S. 680 (1983) (advocating narrow interpretation of fee-shifting statutes because of
sovereign immunity concerns); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S.
240 (1975) (articulating a presumption against expanding fee awards unless specifically
authorized by Congress). See also Meredith Z. Maresca, Employee Benefits—Attorneys’
Fees: Supreme Court Rules Parties Must Achieve “Some Success on Merits” to Receive
Fees, 78 U.S.L.W. 1753 (May 25, 2010) (discussing Hardt and that “[g]uided by its
decision in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983), the [C]ourt said that because
nothing in the section showed that Congress meant to abandon the traditional ‘American
rule’ that each party is responsible for its own attorneys’ fees unless a statute says
otherwise, some degree of success on the merits was necessary for an award of fees”).
132 Silecchia, supra note 114, at 10.
133 May, supra note 114, at 4. See also Peter Manus, Our Environmental Rebels: An
Average American Law Professor’s Perspective on Environmental Advocacy and the Law,
40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 499, 514 (2006) (“There’s this issue, . . . whether an individual can
actually sue the government if the government decides to ignore its NEPA-based
responsibility to minimize its impacts on the environment. And without the threat of a
lawsuit with a resounding punishment at its conclusion, . . . we’re back to Holmes’ ‘bad
man’ calculus and the reality that NEPA has less clout than its upbeat list of policy goals
might appear to provide. . . . ‘The lack of attention to NEPA’s policies speaks to the
tendency of our society to devalue those provisions of law that are not enforceable through
the judicial system.’ And in writing the NEPA statute but leaving it less than readily
enforceable, Congress has not ignored the environment. To the contrary, Congress has
addressed it, yet managed to leave it vulnerable to unredressable abuses.” (footnote
omitted)).
134 See May, supra note 114, at 11 (“Notice, preclusion, jurisdictional, constitutional
and fee defenses, though not the only issues facing citizen suitors, are often preeminent.”).
Some hurdles not addressed in this Article include the requirement in statutorily
authorized citizen suits that plaintiffs allege an ongoing violation and that the government
not be diligently prosecuting the violation. See Stubbs, supra note 114, at 86 (“[The effect
of Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49 (1987)
created] more litigation issues for defendants to raise (thereby prolonging litigation), for
reducing the deterrent effects of the statute [CWA] by not imposing civil penalties on
parties who had clearly violated the statute, and for decreasing incentives for industry to
comply with the Clean Water Act.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 89 (“Gwaltney seems to
have had the uniform effect of creating another layer of dispute in citizen suit litigation,
but the differences among courts appear mainly to be technical variations.”). See also
Reisinger et al., supra note 114, at 53 (“[C]ourts have placed citizen plaintiffs with the
burden of proving that the state’s prosecution is not diligent. Courts have held that
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the resources and capacity to extensively research and allege proof of
a direct and personalized injury, that the injury is ongoing, and that
the form of relief is recognized by the Supreme Court, even if
Congress already statutorily recognizes the relief requested.”135 Of the
prudential doctrines, the most troublesome is separation of powers.136
Its use by defendants in environmental litigation is increasing.137 The
diligence will be presumed, and, where an agency has specifically addressed concerns of
analogous citizen suit, ‘deference to an agency’s plan of attack is particularly favored.’”
(quoting Am. Canoe Ass’n v. City of Attalla, No. 03-AR-0293-M, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25057, at *6 (N.D. Ala. May 13, 2003)); id. at 3 (“The cooperative framework, which
presupposes diligent and uniform state regulation, has broken down. State and federal
enforcement budgets are being slashed, reducing government oversight and potentially
allowing more violations of law to go unpunished. Moreover, political considerations—
including interstate competition and pressure from industry to minimize regulation—
threaten to further compromise the states’ ability to enforce the laws. As government
enforcement becomes increasingly less reliable, citizen enforcement of environmental law
is more necessary than ever.” (footnote omitted)).
135 Stubbs, supra note 114, at 130 (noting that modern standing jurisprudence is a
“change from generous jurisdictional requirements in the 1970s”); see generally Babcock,
Problem with Particularized Injury, supra note 129 (discussing modern standing
jurisprudence). But see Manus, supra note 133, at 518 (“It can be tough for
environmentalists to swallow, but a good-sized portion of environmental law is all about
circumventing the blunt fact that whales can’t sue. We must sue for them, and that means
that either their injuries must translate into our own injuries or we must convince the law
to recognize us as the whales’ legal protectors. But before the law can see things that way,
the culture must see them that way.” (footnote omitted)).
136 Another troublesome prudential doctrine is the political question doctrine. See Philip
Weinberg, “Political Questions”: An Invasive Species Infecting the Courts, 19 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 155, 157 (2008) (noting the test for whether there is a nonjusticiable
political question embedded in a particular case is whether it involves issues “‘decided, or
to be decided, by a political branch of government coequal with this Court,’ or leading to
‘embarrassment of our government abroad,’ or ‘policy determinations for which judicially
manageable standards are lacking?’” (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962))).
Weinberg’s article discusses the application of political question doctrine to environmental
cases and shows the doctrine should not block courts from hearing these disputes. See also
id. at 158 (“[T]he requirements of a nonjusticiable political question as ‘a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion . . . .’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at
217)); John Harrison, The Relation Between Limitations on and Requirements of Article III
Adjudication, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1367, 1375 (2007) (“[T]he fear that drives judicial
reticence in political question cases is about second-guessing highly sensitive and
discretionary decisions, even when those decisions are about or substantially constrained
by legal principles.”); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question”, 79
NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1033–39 (1984) (setting out the history, scope, and rationale for the
doctrine).
137 See May, supra note 114, at 37 (“Defendants are raising novel separation of powers
defenses to citizen enforcement suits.”).
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core concern implicit in this doctrine—and reflected in the many
issues “that cluster about Article III” such as standing, mootness, and
ripeness—is what Professor John Harrison calls “an idea, which is
more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory,
about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an
unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.”138
When an environmental plaintiff is denied access to the courts
because of a jurisdictional defect in the case’s presentment, either for
constitutional or prudential reasons, that usually means the case is
over, as “[t]here is not necessarily another more concerned
environmental plaintiff waiting to challenge a defendant’s conduct”
after the first plaintiff’s suit has been dismissed.139 When these
jurisdictional barriers are added to the Court’s disinclination “to give
deference to the legislature, analytic confusion in the lower courts,
and normative decision making by judges,” citizen suit litigation,
including those cases brought by environmental clinics, is all but
hobbled.140 The Court’s antagonistic demeanor toward citizen suits
has an impact well beyond environmental litigation. “[I]t
demonstrates general judicial hostility to all forms of nontraditional
litigation,”141 what Professor Luban calls “progressive” litigation142—
the type of litigation typically brought by clinics.
138 Harrison, supra note 136, at 1367 (“All of the doctrines that cluster about Article
III—not only standing but mootness, ripeness, political question, and the like—relate in
part, and in different though overlapping ways, to an idea, which is more than an intuition
but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to
the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.” Id.
(quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984))); see also id. at 1368 (explaining that
the core of this offensive tactic is that “courts are off their turf,” when injuries are not
sufficiently particularized or the issues raised in the dispute involve too much political
discretion). But see Oliver A. Houck, Standing on the Wrong Foot: A Case for Equal
Protection, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 14 (2007) (“Far from violating the separation of
powers, the [Professor Louis L.] Jaffe school sees citizen standing as vindicating that same
separation. Courts are not making policies here. They are, instead, vindicating laws that
have often been years in the making, forged in democratic debate and compromise, and
now vulnerable to a kind of administrative repeal. No body of laws makes this case more
apparent than environmental law. Not surprisingly, in no other body of law has standing
played such a pivotal role.” (footnotes omitted)).
139 Stubbs, supra note 114, at 131.
140 Id. at 78 (“[F]ailure to give deference to the legislature, analytic confusion in the
lower courts, and normative decision making by judges have all contributed [to] the
hobbling of citizen suit litigation.”).
141 Id. at 131–32 (“Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence in environmental citizen suits is its demonstrated willingness to erode
congressional power to define legal rights and remedies and to rely instead on its own
normative decision making.”); see also Harrison, supra note 136, at 1371 (“[T]he standing
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According to Professor Houck, the arguments particularly about
citizen standing will continue because the elements of Article III
standing “are not what the argument is really about. It is, instead,
about equal access to justice.”143 According to Professor Houck,
environmental law stands at the crossroads of the debate over access
to the courts.144 Standing has become “the causa bellae of
corporations, conservative scholars and business-sponsored public
interest firms that related in no way with its values. In their view they
were responding to a movement of a Rastafarian underclass of hippies
and radicals or, alternatively, of upper class and out-of-touch
elites.”145
Under conventional case or controversy doctrine, their [private]
financial interests will provide them the necessary ticket inside. For
doctrine is essentially negative. It is designed to keep private people from enforcing the
duties that rest on others, including both the government itself and other private people,
simply because those duties have been violated.”).
142 Luban, supra note 7, at 210 n.1 (defining the word “progressive” as meaning “leftof-center, or, more specifically, something like ‘socially and economically egalitarian in
domestic affairs, and cosmopolitan in international affairs’”).
143 Houck, supra note 138, at 2 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 19–20 (adding to
standing “a wide range of defenses, including ripeness, mootness, private right of action
and the political question doctrine” as well as constitutional challenges based “on the
commerce clause, the dormant commerce clause, private property rights, federalism and
preemption, all with the goal of re-barring the door.”); Reisinger et al., supra note 114, at
50–51 (“The denial of federal court as a venue for citizen suits . . . has several adverse
effects for citizen litigants, each decreasing the potential for effective public enforcement
of environmental laws.” These include the “[l]oss of [f]ee-shifting [o]pportunities” as
states rarely have fee-shifting laws, which “removes an important incentive to bring suit;”
“[l]ess [i]mpartial [d]ecision-making” as a result of states having elected judges thrusting
“[l]ocal politics . . . into the center of environmental enforcement;” the fact that many
states have their own version of sovereign immunity, which post-Bragg could mean that
“the cloak of sovereign immunity could be used as a complete bar to citizen suit
enforcement of federal environmental standards against recalcitrant state agencies.”). On
the topic of sovereign immunity and the Bragg decision, see generally Hope M. Babcock,
The Effect of the United States Supreme Court’s Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence on
Clean Water Act Citizen Suits: Muddied Waters, 83 OR. L. REV. 47 (2004).
144 See Houck, supra note 138, at 41 (“Environmental law stands at the crossroads of a
great debate at the heart of American governance. The debate is magnified by the number
of people affected, the strength of their beliefs and the size of the impacts on both the
public and private estate.”); see also id. at 20 (“The threshold and principal challenge,
however, has been the standing of environmental plaintiffs to sue. Over the past three
decades, of the twenty-seven Supreme Court opinions with a significant discussion of
standing, one-third have arisen from environmental law. It is the principal battleground
between public and private rights.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 15 (referring to the passage
of environmental laws and saying “[never] has any body of law so broadly pitted public
versus private interests in American life.”).
145 Id. at 17–18 (footnote omitted).
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environmental plaintiffs, it remains a case-by-case fight. If they
lose, for failure to establish sufficient “injury,” or “causation,” or
“redress,” one side of the public-private equation here drops out of
court.146

This result fits exactly with the strategy of clinic opponents, to delawyer one side of the debate.
It does not help that environmental law “seemed perversely
targeted at private industry. . . . [And environmental] cases were also
targeted at the federal agencies that were promoting and approving
these same activities, agencies completely unaccustomed to the public
eye, to say nothing of public challenge. The insult level was intense
all around.”147 Standing is a means by which the courts can keep the
“mob” from “interfering with what America is really about: private
business.”148 According to Professor Houck, “what remains indelible
is this world-view that fuses corporate enterprise with America,
regards critics as enemies, and sees environmental law as the primary
threat.”149 Leading this “Rastafarian” mob of hippies and radicals are
environmental clinics and their clients.150
The Court’s fee-shifting decisions are also problematic for
environmental plaintiffs, including environmental clinics.151 The
Court’s holding in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West
146 Id. at 23 (footnote omitted). But see Manus, supra note 133, at 515 (“Hohfeld points
out that this uncontrolled free-for-all of competing privileges is part of the law, and not
simply a lawless void waiting to be filled. On the bottom line, we see that those who
would create an environmental right are not working in a vacuum. They are working
against an environmental anti-right that we’ve lived with for a long, long time.” (emphasis
omitted)).
147 Houck, supra note 138, at 16.
148 Id. at 12. Houck views the Court’s standing jurisprudence as “a means by which
courts grant particular private advocates privileged claims on the conduct of public
policy.” Id. at 11 (quoting JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS: HOW PUBLIC LAW
DISTORTS PUBLIC POLICY 64 (1989)). See also id. at 8 (“[T]he [standing] doctrine acts as
a rough-justice gatekeeper . . . . What also emerges is that, under this test, members of the
Court and judges below have exercised wide reign in accepting cases they favor and
blocking those they do not, not on the merits but rather on grounds of standing.”); id. at 3
(“By overwhelming percentages, the same judges who deny citizen standing are those who
reject substantive environmental claims across the board.”); id. at 9 (referring to the
“accordion-like nature of the [standing] doctrine”).
149 Id. at 18.
150 Id. at 17.
151 See Luban, supra note 7, at 241 (“In more than half a dozen decisions over the past
fifteen years, the U.S. Supreme Court has cut back on statutorily authorized attorneys’ fees
given to prevailing parties in civil rights and environmental cases.”); Silecchia, supra note
114, at 5 (noting that the lack of judicial fee shifting can have a significant impact on the
way in which environmental statutes are enforced).
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Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources152 severely limits
the use of the catalyst theory to enable the recovery of attorneys’ fees
to only those instances where a plaintiff’s success is embodied in a
court’s decision. The Court’s recent decisions in Astrue v. Ratliff153
and Perdue v. Kenny ex rel. Winn154 have made both the recovery of
fees more difficult and the amount awarded smaller.155 While
recovery of attorneys’ fees is important to public interest
environmental plaintiffs,156 an attorney fee award is crucial for an
532 U.S. 598 (2001).
130 S. Ct. 2521 (2010).
154 130 S. Ct. 1662 (2010).
155 See Silecchia, supra note 114, at 41–42 (“‘[N]early every court that has required a
prevailing party as a prerequisite to fee recovery has applied Buckhannon’s judicial
imprimatur test to reject catalyst claims.’” (quoting Kyle A. Loring, Note, The Catalyst
Theory Meets the Supreme Court—Common Sense Takes a Vacation, 43 B.C. L. REV. 973,
993 (2002))); id. at 40 (“Buckhannon was described as a case that ‘will probably become
known as the most significant attorney’s fees decision of the generation.’” (quoting J.
Douglas Klein, Note, Does Buckhannon Apply? An Analysis of Judicial Application and
Extension of the Supreme Court Decision Eighteen Months After and Beyond, 13 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 99, 100 (2002))). The exceptions have been courts that have
interpreted statutory language awarding fees as appropriate, found in most environmental
laws, to which courts continue to apply the catalyst theory because Buckhannon did not
overrule Ruckelshaus. Id. at 13. See, e.g., id. at 56 (discussing Loggerhead Turtle v. The
Cnty. Council of Volusia Cnty., 307 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2002), in which the Circuit
Court of Appeals “argued for a narrow reading of Buckhannon . . . [because] (i) ‘there is
clear evidence that Congress intended that a plaintiff whose suit furthers the goals of a
“whenever . . . appropriate” statute be entitled to recover attorney fees;’ (ii) that the
Buckhannon opinion ‘expressly addressed only the meaning of “prevailing party”’ and
never mentioned Ruckelshaus, the landmark ‘whenever . . . appropriate’ case; and, finally,
(iii) that the ESA [Endangered Species Act] provides for equitable relief only. Therefore,
the court concluded that failing to allow for the catalyst rule would ‘cripple the citizen suit
provision of the Endangered Species Act.’” (third and fourth alterations in original)
(footnotes omitted)). Silecchia considers “[t]he most disturbing aspect of the postBuckhannon landscape is that it has given rise to two vastly different standards for
allocating fees. . . . [and] the gulf between these two standards is growing.” Id. at 61.
156 Due to the expense and complexity of developing and proving environmental claims
and the imbalance of resources between environmental plaintiffs and industrial or
government defendants, attorneys’ fees in environmental cases are particularly important
to public interest organizations. See Ugalde, supra note 114, at 594 (“Fee-shifting
provisions can be useful because environmental litigation is often expensive given the
complex and technical natters at issue. This type of litigation also is costly because in
many cases the defendants are the government or private industries that have substantial
resources at their disposal.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 610 (“Environmental litigation is
extremely costly and requires substantial resources rarely at the disposal of environmental
public interest groups. It is inevitable, therefore, that environmental groups will exhibit
reluctance to bring suit when faced with the prospect of expending hundreds or thousands
of hours and dollars for litigation with little chance of financial return.” (footnote
omitted)). The same imbalance in resources afflicts local environmentalists when they try
to participate in agency proceedings. See also Mihaly, supra note 15, at 168 (“In most
152
153
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environmental clinic dependent on outside funds for its continued
existence. Since plaintiffs cannot recover money damages when they
win an environmental case, often the only way that environmental
attorneys can be reimbursed for their time and expenses is through
court-awarded attorneys’ fees and costs.157 It is not hard to conclude
that the Court’s attorney fee decisions will “have a chilling effect on
citizen suits because the high costs of litigation would preclude the
initiation of suits.”158 They may actually freeze clinic litigation
altogether.
Buckhannon has additional negative consequences for
environmentalist plaintiffs and environmental clinics. By removing
the possibility of attorneys’ fees as an incentive for defendants to
enter into settlements with their protagonists, Buckhannon assures
environmental conflicts, the existing stakeholders have become sophisticated and
experienced actors. They anticipate citizen arguments and know how to counter them. . . .
The media—assisted by the stakeholder proponents—will minimize citizen participation
lacking in content, good presentation, and political acuity.”); id. at 169–70 (“The
environmental effort has become dauntingly complex, an unavoidable result of its success.
. . . [T]he environment is now everything and almost no area of human endeavor lies apart
from its reach. . . . Thus, the human endeavor to protect the environment has emerged as
one of the most complex social efforts ever under-taken. The resulting environmental
regulation of necessity has become as complex as the regulated activity, and now
regulation itself is seen as a mere part of the redesign of society necessary to create a
sustainable future.” (footnote omitted)). Mihaly makes the interesting additional point that
“the increasing complexity of environmental issues has made those situations where values
dominate the proceedings ever more scarce. The environmental endeavor has transitioned
from articulation of values and standards to an era of implementation, where complex
policy, scientific, and economic concerns pervade almost all proceedings,” again
disadvantaging all but the most environmentally and technically sophisticated citizen
participants. Id. at 170.
157 See Ugalde, supra note 114, at 595 (“[E]nvironmental litigation is unique in that the
relief sought is often injunctive rather than monetary. Fee-shifting provisions, therefore,
are a necessary means of reimbursing citizen plaintiffs for their work as private attorneys
general.” (footnote omitted)).
158 Id. at 596 (“Fee-shifting provisions in federal environmental statutes have been the
foundation for bringing thousands of environmental cases.”); see also id. at 599
(discussing the importance of the “catalyst theory” under which attorneys won fee awards
where “the lawsuit acted as a catalyst for the voluntary change of the wrongdoer’s conduct
even if the suit did not result in a favorable judgment or settlement.
. . . The catalyst theory encourages public interest litigation and is an incentive for public
interest groups with limited funds to bring citizen suit actions.” (footnotes omitted)).
Particularly troubling to Silecchia in Buckhannon was the Court’s dismissal as
“‘speculative’ and ‘unsupported by any empirical evidence’ arguments that the catalyst
theory would be necessary ‘to prevent defendants from unilaterally mooting an action
before judgment in order to avoid an award of attorney’s fees’ or to avoid ‘deter[ring]
plaintiffs with meritorious but expensive cases from bringing suit.’” Silecchia, supra note
114, at 37–38 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
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that these cases will drag on longer, expending the cash-strapped
resources of environmental clinics.159 Buckhannon will also lessen the
enthusiasm of defendants to enter into enforceable court-ordered
settlements because attorneys’ fees may be awarded in such
circumstances.160 Buckhannon additionally enables defendants to
completely “avoid an award of attorney’s fees as long as the
compliance occurred prior to resolution by the courts” where a suit
with a high likelihood of success prompts the defendant to cease its
illegal behavior—usually at the last minute, and after the plaintiff has
expended substantial resources.161
By limiting the circumstances in which attorneys’ fees may be
awarded to environmental clinics and the amount they may collect,
the Court has stripped them of critical funds to enable their continued
existence as congressionally mandated private attorneys general under
159 Ugalde, supra note 114, at 608. But see id. at 612 (“[Before] Buckhannon the threat
of litigation often prompted a quick settlement in order to avoid high litigation costs and
an award of fees,” noting that while “Buckhannon did not entirely eliminate settlement
options, by restricting settlement to court-ordered consent decrees the Court has seriously
impaired the motivation to settle.” (footnote omitted)).
160 See id. at 613 (“Defendants now will be reluctant to enter into court-sanctioned
consent decrees because of the increased possibility of being subjected to an award of
attorney’s fees. The incentive to settle also is severely reduced in that the defendant may
attempt to voluntarily cease the wrongful conduct in order to avoid fees altogether.”
(footnote omitted)). See also Silecchia, supra note 114, at 63–71 (discussing various
policy implications raised by Buckhannon’s abandonment of catalyst theory, such as
whether it will affect parties’ willingness to settle and/or influence the contents of those
agreements; the enhanced ability of “defendants to moot cases deliberately on the eve of
judgment to avoid paying fees,” especially injunctions that “are much more easily
mooted”; possibly drive interested public interest lawyers out of the field of environmental
citizen suit litigation; assure only the filing of the strongest cases and thus reduce the
potential “political, media-related, and symbolic ramifications of litigation”).
161 Ugalde, supra note 114, at 609. Ugalde also notes that the decision in Buckhannon
“potentially undermines the benefits presumed by environmentalists to arise from the
Court’s decision in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. . . . The
relaxed standing requirements of Laidlaw may be no more than a hollow victory, however,
when viewed in light of the Court’s decision in Buckhannon.” Id. at 610 (footnotes
omitted). See also Silecchia, supra note 114, at 66–67 (“‘[P]laintiff’s attorneys say that
[barring catalyst recovery] gives defendants an incentive to drive litigation along,
requiring plaintiff’s counsel to expend significant resources and then, at the eleventh hour
when plaintiffs appear likely to prevail, unilaterally change their policies to moot the
litigation and award a fee award.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Marcia Coyle,
Fee Change is a Sea Change, NAT’L L.J., June 11, 2001, at A1)); id. at 80 (“Ironically, the
failure to correct the Buckhannon decision could lead to plaintiff’s attorneys dragging out
law suits beyond a point in time where the parties could reach a fair settlement, in order to
insure that they meet the Buckhannon definition of ‘prevailing party.’ This will increase
the costs of litigation and discourage settlement.” (quoting Settlement Encouragement and
Fairness Act, S. 1117, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Sen. Feingold))).
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most environmental laws.162 These decisions have chilled lawsuits not
only against private economic interests, but also against the
government.163 For those members of the Court who rail against the
idea of citizens flooding courts with unmeritorious claims and
interfering litigation destabilizing the status quo,164 it is a natural step
162 Ugalde, supra note 114, at 611 (“[T]he [Buckhannon] Court strips many
environmental public interest groups of the funds necessary to fulfill their role as private
attorneys general.”); see also id. at 612 (“[A]llowing compensation to citizen groups
through the award of fees furthers these goals by providing an incentive to continue to
augment agency enforcement.”); Silecchia, supra note 114, at 39 (“[T]he dissent [in
Buckhannon] painted a gloomy picture of the impact Buckhannon would have on citizen
litigation generally. . . . [Warning] that by rejecting the catalyst theory, the majority would
‘impede access to court for the less well-heeled, and shrink the incentive Congress created
for the enforcement of federal law by private attorneys general.’” (quoting Buckhannon
Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 623
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (2001))).
163 Ugalde, supra note 114, at 611 (“Due to the expected decreased enforcement from
agencies and environmental public interest groups, potential violators are the ultimate
beneficiaries of the elimination of the catalyst rule. Defendants may find it more
advantageous economically to continue violating the law because of the reduced risk of a
fees award. Additionally, even if enforcement actions are brought against them, defendants
can avoid litigation costs simply by ceasing their behavior.”). See also May, supra note
114, at 10–11 (“[J]udicial trends show courts construing citizen suit notice requirements
more strictly. . . . [J]udicial trends show less tolerance for citizen suits seeking agency
compliance with mandatory duties (‘action forcing’ cases) absent a strong showing that the
federal agency (usually EPA) failed entirely to perform a mandatory duty Congress
specifically ordered accomplished by a date certain deadline. . . . [And] constitutional
defenses continue to limit citizen suits. . . . Mootness continues to loom large.” (footnotes
omitted)).
164 These same concerns underlie the benefits of public participation in agency
decision-making. See Mihaly, supra note 15, at 164–65 (stating that public participation in
government decision-making improves society as it: “[i]mproves decisions by providing
decision-makers with relevant and accurate information; [h]elps decision-makers gauge
the nature and depth of public opinion; [i]ntroduces new concepts that staff or frequent
participants may not advance; [i]nforms decision-makers of the substance, weight,
significance and politics of stakeholder concerns in ways that staff cannot; [p]rovides an
organizing device and political entrance vehicle for new stakeholders who, in turn, can
reorder public priorities and advocate for new governing processes; [p]rovides a vehicle
for public policy advocacy on the substantive issues which, in turn, may change the
politics in question; . . . [e]nhances the depth and detail of news reporting on the subject,
thus educating the general public; and [c]ounters corruption, collusion, and graft.”); id. at
165 (“Change to the underlying process is significant because it in turn may change the
eventual outcome.”). A more serious concern is the growth of ecoterrorism. See Donna E.
Correll, Note, No Peace for the Greens: The Criminal Prosecution of Environmental
Activists and the Threat of Organizational Liability, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 773, 777 (1993)
(“The aggressive tactics of the more militant environmental groups are causing alarm
within law enforcement agencies. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Domestic
Terrorism Unit has actively pursued the prosecution of environmental ‘terrorists.’”). One
response has been “congressional legislation addressing ecotage, and a new policy of law
enforcement priority for the prosecution of environmental activists.” Id. Pressure from
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to render decisions that hamstring those efforts. A less salutary result
for lower courts may be the chilling effect of those decisions on
settling these cases, which will ensure continued expenditure not only
of environmentalist plaintiffs’ resources, but also those of the court.
Despite the hurdles placed in the way of environmental suits165 and
the vehemence of their detractors, they keep getting filed.166 On
average, per year, there have been “nearly 770 citizen ‘actions’ a
year⎯aggregating notices (about 650), complaints (at least 70) and
judicial consent orders (at least 50). Coupled with an average of 83
reported decisions annually, there are about 850 citizen suit ‘legal
events’ every year.”167 Despite the Court’s best efforts to stop them,
these lawsuits
have transformed the environmental movement, and with it, society.
[They] have secured compliance by myriad agencies and thousands
of polluting facilities, diminished pounds of pollution produced by
the billions, and protected hundreds of rare species and thousands of
timber industry lobbyists resulted in the passage of legislation criminalizing tree-spiking,
and lobbyists “from several industries, including livestock, mining, and timber industries
from the Pacific Northwest, have been especially aggressive in seeking to curtail
environmental activism affecting industry in part by lobbying for tougher measures
directed against ecoterrorism. . . . [R]outine media attention requested by
environmentalists for demonstrations and events to publicize environmental issues has
resulted in an unexpected law enforcement backlash. Consequently, tougher prosecution
policies against environmental activism have also been more widely publicized. Such
attention is calculated to have a chilling effect on specific ‘direct-action’ organizations,
and perhaps on the environmental movement generally.” Id. at 777–78.
165 See Stubbs, supra note 114, at 79–80 (“Citizen suits are limited in multiple ways:
they are only available for enforcement of administrative regulations and cannot be used to
gain judicial review of related common law principles; monetary fines awarded must be
paid to the U.S. Treasury; and the provisions do not establish private rights of action or per
se negligence in private common law suits. . . . The plaintiffs cannot themselves receive
cash payments from the defendants . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). Stubbs’ article also lists
limitations, including the availability of preemption by government action, the
jurisdictional requirements of a pre-filing notice letter warning the defendants and the
government of the plaintiffs’ intent to sue, that the violation be ongoing, and that the
government not be diligently prosecuting the alleged violator.
166 See May, supra note 114, at 47 (“As gravity is to Earth, environmental citizen suits
are to environmental law, easily overlooked, but always there, tugging toward a hard
surface.”).
167 Id. at 9. See also id. at 4–5 (“Since 1995, citizens have filed 426, or about one
lawsuit a week, and have earned 315 compliance-forcing judicial consent orders, under the
CWA and CAA alone. During the same period, under all environmental statutes, citizens
have submitted more than 4,500 notices of intent to sue, including more than 500 and
4,000 against agencies and members of the regulated community, respectively. This is an
astonishing pace over eight years of about two notices of intent to sue every business day,
which easily outpaces EPA referrals for enforcement to the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ).”).
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acres of ecologically important land. The foregone monetary value
of citizen enforcement has conserved innumerable agency resources
and saved taxpayers billions.168

168 Id. at 3–4 (footnotes omitted). May attributes a slight decline in the number of
citizen suits being filed to many factors, including the constitutional, prudential, and
statutory jurisdictional barriers citizens must scale. May also notes a palpable sense of
patriotism and fair play among environmental organizations to give federal agencies more
leeway to divert resources and attend to new priorities after September 11, 2001. See id. at
30–31 (“The number of agency forcing notices and cases has declined since 1995, and
dramatically so since 1999. [The decline] is likely attributable to [the fact that] citizens
have all but exhausted nondiscretionary duty citizen suits to enforce water quality
requirements . . . . [T]he Bush Administration [was] more prone both to defend itself
vigorously against citizen suits and to contest attorney fees in light of Buckhannon,
making action-forcing litigation less attractive. . . . [I]t is more challenging to find courts
sympathetic to environmental issues . . . .”); see also id. at 21–22 (explaining a recent
decline in citizen enforcement actions as being due to “the energy and resources necessary
to perfect a notice of intent to sue eclips[ing] those for preparing a civil complaint. The
prospects of extensive preclusion, jurisdictional, standing, procedural and merits
challenges may dissuade some from the pursuit. . . . [Also implicated is] the ascendancy of
the Court’s Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity jurisprudence mak[ing] citizen
enforcement suits against states⎯who are often significant polluters that lack the
resources or will to comply⎯less likely.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 9 (“Statistical trends,
however, reveal an overall decline in citizen legal events since 1995, although the numbers
are rebounding. Three factors likely contribute most significantly to the decline.” First, the
difficulty, costs, and length of time its takes environmental plaintiffs to overcome “the
statutory and constitutional architecture of environmental citizen suits,” often achieving
results that are “either fleeting or dubious.” Second, the ambivalence of courts toward
citizen suits is reflected in their granting deference to defendant administrative agencies.
“Some [judges] are hostile to them, few know much about them, and fewer still are
conversant with the myriad suite of statutory, common and constitutional law citizen suits
occupy. Third, . . . many citizen litigators had misgivings about how the Court would
resolve Laidlaw, and about associated aftershocks.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 29 (“Courts
are also loath to find EPA has a mandatory duty to enforce the law.”); id. at 30 (“The
spoils of successful action forcing cases can be fleeting. Even after finding an agency has
failed to meet a mandatory duty, courts limit relief solely to what the enabling statute
specifically provides be done, and no more, no matter how dilatory or environmentally
destructive the delay. Recent agency forcing cases show injunctive relief is usually
limited.”). May also notes that despite what appears to be a “recent upward swing in
citizen enforcement cases, . . . those against state and local governments are waning,
possibly owing to the Supreme Court’s recent extensions of the degree of sovereign
immunity states enjoy under the Eleventh Amendment . . . .” Id. at 21. In addition, May
comments on the decline in agency referrals to the DOJ, as well as EPA initiated
enforcement actions and judicially enforceable settlements. Id. at 41 (“[T]he total number
(not just CWA and CAA) of environmental civil actions filed by the DOJ is down by 20%
. . . .”). There has been “a stark decline” of judicially enforceable settlements in CWA and
CAA enforcement cases: “a 40% decrease.” Id. at 41–42 (“[C]ivil penalties and SEP
values EPA has recouped in the last five years are down by an eye-opening 62 and 70%
respectively.”).
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On the other hand, the sheer quantity of these lawsuits and their
overall success169 cannot help but strengthen the protestations of their
opponents, including those who attack clinics for bringing such cases.
One may see reflected in the actions of the Court and in the
rhetoric of those who oppose citizen suits how environmental clinics
inherited all of the animosity toward environmentalist plaintiffs. In
that sense, environmental clinics and their clients are
indistinguishable from other plaintiffs who challenge industrial or
governmental practices for being in nonconformance with
environmental laws, except for the fact that the burdens created by
this opposition are heavier for clinics without the resources of the
wealthier environmental organizations to surmount them. The story
could end here, a story about hostility toward public access to the
courts, in which clinics play a minor role in challenging entrenched
economic interests and the governmental status quo. But there may be
another story to tell. This second story has its basis in the legal
profession’s problems with incivility, and centers on the aggressive,
intimidating behavior clinic opponents—often lawyers or economic
interests advised by lawyers—display toward clinicians and their
students. This behavior feeds on anti-environmental rhetoric and on
the Court’s thinly veiled hostility toward environmental litigation and
the lawyers who bring and try those cases. It is to this story that this
Article now turns.
B. Clinic Opponents as Bullies
It may be no accident that lawyers “often play a prominent, and
sometimes dominant, role in interfering in law school clinics”170
despite “ethics rules and advisory ethics opinions urging the legal
profession to make legal services available to all in need . . . .”171
After all, lawyers are merely “zealously” representing their clients’
interests, which are under attack as a result of some environmental
clinic’s misguided sense of the illegality of their client’s actions.
169 Id. at 2 (“From 1978 to 1983, citizens averaged less than 100 notices of intent to sue
a year, most of which were Clean Water Act (CWA) cases. By comparison, citizens
averaged about 550 notices of intent to sue a year from 1995 through 2002, spread
liberally throughout the nation’s environmental laws.” (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 3
(“Since the first environmental citizen suit in 1970, and 880 more by 1988, citizens of all
walks and pursuits, some with environmental interests, other economic, have filed more
than 2,000 citizen suits.” (footnotes omitted)).
170 Kuehn & Joy, Ethics Critique, supra note 8, at 1990.
171 Id. at 2022.
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However, the behavior this section addresses is more than just
“zealous representation,” however misguided some lawyers’
interpretation of that now defunct standard may be. The intimidation
litigation tactics that some lawyers use against clinics go way beyond
any interpretation of a lawyer’s representational duty to her client.
This section of the Article seeks to understand what may happen to a
lawyer when confronted by students who have not yet been admitted
to the bar,172 let alone received their law degree. It may be that there is
something vaguely demeaning and incipiently threatening to a
lawyer’s sense of self-worth in those situations that incites bullying
behavior, leading lawyers, who are feeling the economic stresses of a
recession, to fall back on the intimidation tactics they learned in law
school and brought with them into practice.173 Alternatively, it may be
something as simple as lawyers misconstruing their ethical duty
toward their clients that encourages the incivility one finds today in
the conduct of lawyers, which spills over into bullying behavior
toward their legal opponents—in this case, clinical students.174
There is no question in my mind that the tactics I have observed
some lawyers use over my years as a clinical director fall within the
definition of bullying. Although bullying is an “imprecise term with
many subtypes and categories,” what I have observed is consistent
with how the literature on bullying describes this type of antisocial
behavior—the repeated use of “practices that are ‘directed
deliberately or unconsciously, [to] cause humiliation, offence and
distress, and that interfere with . . . performance and/or cause an
unpleasant . . . environment.”175 One usually observes bullying when
172 See deNeve et al., supra note 10, at 540 (“These [business] groups seek to address
situations they view as problematic, including: ‘students being empowered with all the
rights of a fully qualified member of the Louisiana Bar;’ ‘. . . [expressing] legal views
[that] are in direct conflict with business positions;’ . . . .” (second and fourth alterations in
original) (footnote omitted) (quoting letters from the Business Council of New Orleans
and the chamber of commerce to Louisiana Supreme Court Chief Justice Calogero)).
173 See Stephanie Francis Ward, Immature Antics: Confront Lawyer Bullies Head On,
Without Apology, A.B.A. J., July 2004, at 32 (describing the experience of a Dallas
Assistant District Attorney confronted by the bullying tactics of a defense attorney).
174 Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Reasons, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 189, 208 (1999)
(“A cause is only a cause. It is not per se an excuse.”).
175 Rebecca Flanagan, Lucifer Goes to Law School: Towards Explaining and
Minimizing Law Student Peer-to-Peer Harassment and Intimidation, 47 WASHBURN L.J.
453, 455 (2007) (alterations in original) (footnote omitted); see also David C. Yamada,
The Phenomenon of "Workplace Bullying” and the Need for Status-Blind Hostile Work
Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475, 480 (2000) (Workplace bullying is “‘the
deliberate, hurtful and repeated mistreatment of a [t]arget . . . by a bully . . . that is driven
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there is a power imbalance between the bully and her victim.176 Often
the bully is seeking to control an individual or a situation.177
Sometimes the problem stems from a narcissistic personality,
involving haughtiness and projecting blame for failure on others.
Other times a problem may result from an attempt to preserve the
bully’s status quo, where the bully makes excuses for his own
shortcomings or elevates her own sense of self-worth through
intimidation and unwarranted unprofessional behavior toward
others.178

“Haunted by feelings of inadequacy, bullies ‘lash out at others who
threaten their presumption of superiority’ by doing what they can to
undermine them.”179
The targets of bullies are often “nice people” because bullies
reason that nice people are unlikely “to confront or stop them.”180
Sometimes, the victims are “vulnerable people” who “present a
nonthreatening profile by their words and actions.”181 Other times, the
victims are the “bold, best, and brightest.”182 Critical to a bully’s
success is the low probability that there will be any immediate
consequences from his/her aberrant behavior, either from the bully’s
by the bully’s desire to control [another person].’ The term ‘bullying’ includes ‘all types of
mistreatment at work’” (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting GARY NAMIE
& RUTH NAMIE, BULLYPROOF YOURSELF AT WORK! 17 (1999)). “Social psychologist
and professor Loraleigh Keashly refers to workplace bullying as ‘emotional abuse,’
characterized by ‘hostile verbal and nonverbal, nonphysical behaviors directed at a
person(s) such that the target’s sense of him/herself as a competent person and worker is
negatively affected.’” Id. (quoting Loraleigh Keashly, Emotional Abuse in the Workplace:
Conceptual and Empirical Issues, 1 J. EMOTIONAL ABUSE, no. 1, 1998, at 85, 87).
176 See Yamada, supra note 175, at 480–81 (“Under Keashly’s conceptualization,
power imbalances between the bully and target usually are present.”).
177 See Jill Schachner Chanen, Taking a Bully by the Horns: Victims of Control Freaks
Don’t Have to Suffer Silently, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1999, at 90, 90 (“Bullying is characterized
by a pattern of deliberate, hurtful and menacing behaviors. . . . ‘At its heart, bullying is a
control issue,’ . . . .”).
178 Bullying in Law Firms: Hard to Define, Easy to Spot, YOUR ABA (June 2007),
http://www.abanet.org/media/youraba/200706/article03.html [hereinafter Bullying in Law
Firms]. Bullies may also lack “the specific cognitive capacity to attribute mental states to
oneself and others and to acknowledge that others have beliefs, desires, and intentions that
are different from one’s own.” Flanagan, supra note 175, at 456 (citing Tunde Paal &
Tamas Bereczkei, Adult Theory of Mind, Cooperation, Machiavellianism: The Effect of
Mindreading on Social Relations, 43 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 541, 542
(2007)) (discussing the Theory of the Mind methodology for studying bullying).
179 Yamada, supra note 175, at 482 (citing GARY NAMIE & RUTH NAMIE,
BULLYPROOF YOURSELF AT WORK! 55 (1999)).
180 Id. (citing NAMIE & NAMIE, supra note 179, at 51).
181 Id. (citing NAMIE & NAMIE, supra note 179, at 52–54).
182 Id. (citing NAMIE & NAMIE, supra note 179, at 54).
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victim or by someone else in a position of authority, like a lawyer’s
senior partner or her firm’s management committee, or a court.183
Clinic students easily fit the victim and situational typology; rarely
are there immediate consequences stemming from the bully’s
offensive behavior.
Since bullying behavior is not necessarily a matter of a flawed
disposition, and bullies can be made as a result of situations that they
have been in or currently find themselves in, it is worth examining the
extent to which law schools may incubate bullying characteristics in
their students and law firms may encourage the retention of those
characteristics.184
“Behaviors modeled by professors, intense competition among
students for scarce jobs, and the relationship between class rank and
employment” can encourage students to adopt bullying behavior in
law school.185 In addition, the litigation-oriented law school
curriculum “may teach new lawyers that it is expected and desirable
to be confrontational when a dispute arises, and that it is normal to go
to court at the drop of a hat.”186 Instead of “encouraging students to
resist the bad examples they see in practice, law school may have
conditioned students to mimic them.”187

183 See Flanagan, supra note 175, at 461 (“To rationalize bullying behaviors towards or
by peers, a student needs to be assured there will be no immediate consequences for the
anomalous behavior, either from the victim or by the law school administration. Victims
view the acquiescence of authority figures as consent to the perpetrators’ actions.”
(footnote omitted)).
184 See id. at 457 (discussing the social psychology method of studying bullying,
“[s]ocial psychology is the study of the situational, rather than the dispositional, factors
that impact behavior”); id. (“Bullying is triadic, not dyadic, and the bystanders play as
important a role as the bully and the victim in the creation of a bullying atmosphere.”).
185 Id. at 453; see also id. (“[B]ullying is the unnamed missing link in the causal chain
between the law school curriculum and the prevalence of depression and substance abuse
in law schools.”); id. at 462 (“The intrinsic human need for self-direction is perverted by
the need to compete; this can result in either excessive need to dominate others or learned
helplessness.”).
186 Roger E. Schechter, Changing Law Schools to Make Less Nasty Lawyers, 10 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 367, 374 (1996) (“[T]he prevailing first year curriculum sends the message
that litigation is the best way to solve legal disputes.” Id. (internal quotations marks
omitted)).
187 Id. at 382. See id. at 375 (“Young lawyers file frivolous or socially counterproductive claims, . . . not because they had too much civil procedure in law school, but
because that is what they see other lawyers doing. . . . ‘[I]f what [law students] see in . . .
firms is inconsistent with the ideals taught in law school, the best academic effort may be
for naught.’” (fourth and fifth alterations in original) (quoting American Bar Association,
Report of Comm’n on Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243 (1986))).
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Moreover, the lessons students learn in law school somehow
change them.188 Professor Rebecca Flanagan talks about how law
school, particularly the maxim of “[l]earning to think like a lawyer,”
dehumanizes law students.189 “Dehumanization occurs when ‘others,’
such as law school classmates, are ‘thought not to possess the same
feelings, thoughts, values, and purposes in life that we do.’”190
According to Professor Flanagan, teaching students to think like a
lawyer, what she calls “acquisition of legal logic,” divorces law
students from their emotions, which not only removes “the passion
that brought students to law school, but also alienates them from other
values, such as compassion and sympathy. Without compassion or
sympathy, peers are just hurdles to be removed, not colleagues in the
journey to becoming lawyers.”191 In an academic environment that
encourages students to pay attention only to facts and rules and not
their feelings, it becomes relatively easy for them to “rationalize
bullying behavior as a logical response to competition.”192 A “trust no
one ethos” is also prevalent in law school, which contributes to
students feeling alienated from their peers.193
According to Professor Roger Schecter, the lesson students learn in
law school “seems to be that pure, unadulterated self-interest, and
hardball competition are the rule . . . . It follows, then, that the rule
will stay the same at the law firm as well.”194 Seen as a form of
hazing,195 faculty and law school administrators view bullying “as a
necessary way to teach students what life will be like for them as

188 See Flanagan, supra note 175, at 457 (“Something about the law school
environment changes students, not just internally, as is the case for depression and
substance abuse, but externally, in their relationships with friends, families, and
colleagues.”).
189 Id. at 460 (“Learning to ‘think like a lawyer’ is also dehumanizing. Thinking like a
lawyer is the process of divorcing emotional responses to cases and facts and viewing
them with a logical, critical eye focused on analysis.”).
190 Id. (“‘Dehumanization is one of [two] central processes in the transformation of
ordinary, normal people into indifferent or even wanton perpetrators of evil.’” (alteration
in original) (quoting PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW
GOOD PEOPLE TURN EVIL xii, 219 (2007))).
191 Id. at 465.
192 Id. (“In an environment that encourages students to look at facts and rules instead of
feelings, students can rationalize bullying behavior as a logical response to competition.”).
193 Id. at 464 (“A ‘trust no one’ ethos spreads among many students.”).
194 Schechter, supra note 186, at 391.
195 See Flanagan, supra note 175, at 464 (“These behaviors are often dismissed as ritual
hazing that students need to endure to become part of the legal field.”).
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practicing attorneys.”196 Thus, “[b]ullying and intimidation become a
hazing ritual initiating law students into the legal profession.”197
Law firms today are beset with economic pressures brought on by a
recession economy that did not exist a generation ago. This has led to
increased competition among and within firms. Their exponential
growth has resulted in the disappearance of client loyalty and loyalty
toward one’s colleagues, the loss of time to mentor the behavior of
young lawyers, and greater anonymity among firm lawyers.198
Competition at all levels in the firm is encouraged and “[w]hile no
workplaces are free from bullying . . . law firm environments are
perfect breeding grounds for it. As individuals, lawyers tend to be
ego-driven, aggressive and competitive. As workplaces, firms
encourage competition among lawyers. Together, these characteristics
make law firms bully-prone.”199 Like law schools, bullying behavior
both within and outside of the firm “is not only tolerated but
transcends to being expected,” becoming an accepted part of the
organization’s culture.200 It should be no surprise then that more than
fifty percent of the lawyers who participated in a National Law
Journal study described their colleagues as “obnoxious.”201
“In a profession that prides itself on upholding the laws that govern
society, rules can fly out the window when lawyers become

196 Id. (“Professors may send the message that it is okay to bully in law school because
they are ‘soften[ing] up’ students to be nonchalant about bullying when they see it in
practice.” (alteration in original)).
197 Id. at 465.
198 See Allen K. Harris, The Professionalism Crisis—The “Z” Words and Other Rambo
Tactics: The Conference of Chief Justices’ Solution, PROF. LAW., Winter 2001, at 1, 6
(“[M]ost observers would likely agree that there exists today a substantial civility deficit in
the legal profession. . . . Numerous causes are likely: client expectations based upon
frequent media portrayal of excessively aggressive lawyer styles, increased competition
from growing numbers of attorneys, increasing law firm size with the resulting loss of
senior partner mentoring and role-modeling, new emphasis on advertising, increased
numbers of colleagues with resulting relative anonymity, and institutional incentives for
aggressive utilization of procedural rules.” (first alteration in original) (footnote omitted)
(quoting Brent E. Dickson & Julia Bunton Jackson, Renewing Lawyer Civility, 28 VAL. U.
L. REV. 531, 532 (1994))).
199 Chanen, supra note 177, at 91.
200 Flanagan, supra note 175, at 456.
201 Orrin K. Ames III, Concerns About the Lack of Professionalism: Root Causes
Rather Than Symptoms Must Be Addressed, 28 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 531, 534 (2005)
(“Justice O’Connor [noted] that ‘over 50% of the attorneys surveyed used the word
“obnoxious” to describe their colleagues.’” (quoting Sandra Day O’Connor,
Professionalism, 76 WASH. U.L.Q. 5, 7 (1998))).
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bullies.”202 Although the problem of uncivil behavior has drawn the
attention of local bar associations,203 judges,204 and academics,205
bullying behavior as a part of the problem has garnered less
attention.206 Professor Schechter’s description of what he calls uncivil
behavior—refusing to shake hands in court, name calling, shouting,
use of vulgarities, and temper tantrums—are intimidation tactics that
bear the mark of bullying.207 Sometimes referring to their tactics as
hardball lawyering, lawyers view litigation as war and describe it in
military terms.208 The lawyer’s goal is “to make life miserable” for
opposing counsel, which is reflected in “[a] disdain for common
courtesy and civility, assuming that they ill-befit the true warrior[; a]

Bullying in Law Firms, supra note 178.
See Schechter, supra note 186, at 383 n.57 (reporting that civility codes have been
adopted in Texas, Georgia, Kentucky, Los Angeles, New York, Cleveland, Nashville, and
Little Rock).
204 See Harris, supra note 198, at 5–6 (reporting on the “hell order” issued by
Oklahoma U.S. District Judge Wayne Alley criticizing discovery practices of two lawyers,
as saying “‘[i]f there is a hell to which disputatious, uncivil, vituperative lawyers go, let it
be one in which the dammed are eternally locked in discovery disputes with other lawyers
of equally repugnant attributes.’ In addition to his ‘hell’ order, Judge Alley also issued his
oft-quoted ‘dueling’ order in regard to lawyer incivility: ‘[The response] contains
mutterings about bad faith and personal disputes between counsel. . . . I suppose counsel
have a penumbral Constitutional right to regard each other as schmucks, but I know of no
principle that justifies litigation pollution on account of their personal opinions. This case
makes me lament the demise of duelling [sic]. I cannot order a duel, and thus achieve a
salubrious reduction in the number of counsel to put up with.” (second, third, and fourth
alterations in original) (footnote omitted)).
205 See, e.g., Ames, supra note 201; Harris, supra note 198; Schechter, supra note 186.
206 Much to my surprise when I searched the legal literature for various combinations of
lawyers and bullying, in addition to commentaries in professional journals, I found only
three articles—Flanagan, supra note 175, Yamada, supra note 175, and Schecter, supra
note 186—all of which I have relied on heavily in this part of the Article.
207 See Schechter, supra note 186, at 378–79 (“Lawyers are . . . increasingly prone to
behave as combatants, refusing to extend common courtesies to one another. Sometimes
called the ‘Rambo’ style of litigation, it includes such practices as refusing to return phone
calls, grant routine extensions of deadlines, or even shake hands in court, along with more
abrasive and hostile behaviors such as vulgarity and name calling, shouting, temper
tantrums, or even occasional fisticuffs during deposition.” (footnotes omitted)). Schechter
describes an example of the latter, reported by Newsweek, which occurred in “a Dallas
office tower where a deposition was being taken in a big-ticket commercial case. Lawyers
from two Manhattan firms . . . were arguing over a document when tempers flared.
‘Somebody pointed a finger,’ as the account in Newsweek put it, ‘another grabbed at a
piece of paper, and suddenly three grown men in tailored suits were squirming around the
floor, fists aflying among the bodies.’” Id. at 379 n.44.
208 See id. at 375 n.30 (“[T]he adversary system is male-constructed and is an
‘intellectualized substitute for dueling or medieval jousting.’” (quoting Leslie Bender, A
Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 7 (1988))).
202
203
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wondrous facility for manipulating facts and engaging in revisionist
history[; and a] hair-trigger willingness to fire off unnecessary
motions and to use discovery for intimidation rather than factfinding.”209 Unfortunately, uncivil behavior is not restricted to
litigation; “[i]t infects all aspects of law practice including
transactional, government, public sector, non-profit, and in-house
corporate and other organizational practices.”210
One excuse lawyers who practice these “hardball” intimidation
tactics give is that they are merely being zealous advocates on behalf
of their clients; thus, giving their behavior not only the imprimatur of
their peers, but also of their profession.211 However, Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.3 to “diligent[ly] represent[]” one’s client has
replaced Canon 7’s duty of “zealous representation.”212 The Model
Rules deleted “zealous” from the Code perhaps because under the old
standard some lawyers believed that their clients were served best “by
the intimidation of opponents, a relentless refusal to accommodate,
and the use of tactics that impose escalating expenses on an
adversary,”213 justifying unprofessional behavior and a “‘Rambo’ or
Harris, supra note 198, at 10.
Id. at 12 (“Lack of professionalism and the need to cure it extend beyond litigation.”
Id. (quoting WORKING GROUP ON LAWYER CONDUCT AND PROFESSIONALISM, A
NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON LAWYER CONDUCT AND PROFESSIONALISM (1999),
available at http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/natlplan/NatlActionPlan.html (adopted by the
Conference of Chief Justices))). See also Schecter, supra note 186, at 380 (“The problem
of incivility also involves the bench. Lawyers complain of rude and arrogant judges whose
inappropriate behavior is then mimicked by members of the local bar.”).
211 See Harris, supra note 198, at 5 (“Stephen L. Carter laments the apparent perception
that in law, and in politics, the job of the hired professional requires incivility. . . . [and
referring to a New York divorce lawyer as saying] in response to New York’s chief
judge’s proposed rules of civility between opposing counsel . . . ‘I have never heard a
client complain that his or her lawyer was rude.’”).
212 Id. at 10. See also id. at 12–13 (“Lawyers who rationalize ‘Rambo’ tactics as
zealousness are, perhaps, confusing the former duty of ‘zealous representation,’ contained
in the former Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Canon 7), with the current duty
to represent one’s client diligently as set forth in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Rule 1.3).” Alternatively, “such lawyers may be erroneously relying on the wording in the
Preamble to the Rules of Professional Conduct or the language in the Comment to Rule
1.3” which says lawyers “should ‘act with zeal.’”); id. at 13 (noting that the Preamble to
Rule 1.3 states that “[a]s [an] advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts a client’s position under
the rules of the adversary system” and that “a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf
of his client” as well as a “Comment to Rule 1.3 which provides that attorneys should ‘act
with zeal.’”).
213 Id. at 5 (“Some [lawyers] perceive abusive conduct as gaining new adherence
cloaked in the mantle of forceful advocacy.” (quoting Richard A. Gilbert, Standards of
Professional Courtesy, 1 HCBA LAWYER No. 7, 30 (June/July, 1991))); id. at 12
(“[T]here is a causal connection between incivility in the legal profession and zealous
209
210
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‘win at all costs,’ attitude.”214 Lawyers may also be relying too
heavily on ethical rules to fulfill their professional obligations.215 But,
a lawyer’s professional obligations encompass “what is more broadly
expected of them, both by the public and by the best traditions of the
legal profession itself.”216 Uncivil behavior and bullying tactics do not
comport with either expectation, let alone any sense of what it is to be
a “professional.”217
The extent to which lawyers trained as bullies in the use of
intimidation tactics are fueling attacks on environmental clinics
requires empirical demonstration, which is beyond the scope of this
Article. It is only a theory, but perhaps an intriguing one.
Environmental clinical directors and students fit the profile of victims
of bullying, and their attackers that of schoolyard bullies, picking on
their weaker and more vulnerable opponents. Their tactics come
straight from the schoolyard—yelling at, threatening, and demeaning
their victims—and because they are lawyers, instead of a stick or their
fists, they use their skills to abuse the legal process to drive their
advocacy. . . . Sadly, among all too many attorneys today, zealous advocacy is not viewed
so much as an ethical responsibility as it is a weapon to use to club opponents.” (second
alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Luban, supra note 7, at
219 (“[Instead of having an adversarial system of litigation that maximizes] high-quality
input, our adversary system of litigation builds in a principle of zeal that requires lawyers
to hide the ball.”).
214 Harris, supra note 198, at 10 (quoting an Illinois circuit judge, “Zealous advocacy is
the buzz word which is squeezing decency and civility out of the law profession. Zealous
advocacy is the doctrine which excuses, without apology, outrageous and unconscionable
conduct, so long as it is done ostensibly for a client, and, of course, for a price” (emphasis
in original)).
215 See id. at 7 (“[O]ver reliance on lawyer ethical codes as the ‘complete fulfillment of
legal ethics’ or as the standard lawyers should aspire to, is probably a more accurate,
fundamental cause of the malaise in legal professionalism.” (footnote omitted)).
216 Id. (distinguishing between Rules of Professional Conduct or other ethical rules and
“professionalism,” and also saying “It is easy . . . to confuse compliance with the rules
with being moral and . . . minimally acceptable conduct with acting as a professional.”
(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
217 Unfortunately, lawyer misconduct has a broader impact than just on its victims. See
id. at 6 (identifying as among the impacts of lawyer misconduct on interests larger than
clients and lawyers “(1) the influence of the law as an institution with a critical role in a
democratic society; (2) the cost of administering the justice system; (3) the impact that the
efficiency of the legal system has on society as a whole; and (4) the future of the privilege,
often taken for granted, of lawyer self-regulation”). See also id. at 5 (quoting Richard A.
Gilbert, former chairperson of the Hillsborough County Association’s Profession Conduct
Committee as saying “Many believe that relations between lawyers have so deteriorated
that our profession nears a crisis⎯one that not only implicates how we deal with each
other but threatens our usefulness to society, the ability of our clients to bear the cost of
our work, and the essential values that mark us as professionals.”).
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antagonists from court. At minimum, these antics are a distraction
from the hard work facing environmental clinics; at maximum, they
may undermine the psychological toughness of clinics to face off
against these bullies, leading to avoidance rather than unpleasant
confrontations. They may also have a scarring effect on students,
dissuading them from pursuing a career in litigation, especially public
interest litigation. When added to third-party campaigns to defund
clinics or otherwise curtail their practice and the Court’s hostility
toward environmental citizen suits, these intimidation practices may
be the final factor driving clinics away from certain cases.
These explanations for the continuing attacks on clinics do not lend
themselves to easy solutions as they stem either from the current
conservative Court’s antagonism toward opening courts to
environmental litigants or from the bullying behavior of lawyers. The
Court’s antagonism has fed anti-citizen suit rhetoric, which has been
directed at environmental clinics, and has resulted in decisions that
offer defendant attorneys an array of delaying and debilitating
procedural maneuvers with which to harass their clinical opponents
and drive them from court. The incipient bully in lawyers, nourished
by law schools and firms, finds in the vulnerability of clinical
directors and students tempting targets for intimidating practices
unchecked by a misguided sense of the lawyer’s ethical duties toward
her clients. Although efforts are underway to reform the curriculum of
law schools to make it less litigation oriented, changing law school
culture to make it less of a breeding ground for bullies, as well as
increasing the oversight of the professional behavior of lawyers
through bar civility codes, is akin to turning an aircraft carrier around.
The overwhelming momentum toward bullying behavior driven by a
highly competitive recession economy and the successful deployment
of bullying tactics to advance in law school and in private practice
means that change will not come soon or easily.
One possible approach to bullying behavior is to make clinics less
vulnerable to intimidation tactics by making their directors more
secure in their jobs. This could be done by granting them tenure or
long-term contracts, and by teaching clinicians and students how to
respond to these attacks,218 including by filing complaints with the

218 See, e.g., Bullying in Law Firms, supra note 178 (describing proactive measures that
can be taken in law firms to reduce bullying); Flanagan, supra note 175, at 468 (suggesting
changes in law schools to reduce the “systemic failures that give rise to bullies”); accord
Chanen, supra note 177, at 91 (suggesting proactive steps for victims of bullying to take,
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local bar. An approach to judicial hostility is to use other branches of
government, negotiation, grassroots organizing, and the press for
resolving environmental disputes.219 However, none of these
approaches guarantees that individual attacks on environmental
clinics will end or that those attacks will not be sufficiently successful
to warrant their repetition elsewhere.
IV
CONCLUSION
There exists a decades-long phenomenon of attacks on
environmental clinics despite their professional, pedagogical, and
public benefits. There are two particularly intractable, intertwined
reasons for these attacks—namely, judicial hostility toward opening
the courts to the types of cases clinics bring and the emergence of a
new type of lawyer, whose response to the increasing economic
competitiveness of the legal profession is to engage in intimidation
tactics, finding easy targets in environmental clinicians and students.
Reforming the behavior of these lawyers is no easier than making
courts more welcoming toward the types of cases environmental
clinics file; both verge on the impossible. Instead, the solution may be
to harden the targets to be less vulnerable and to seek places other
than the courts to resolve environmental disputes. However, neither of
these solutions gets to the root cause of the problem; both seek to
solve it by avoidance or deflection. By understanding how judicial
hostility toward the type of cases clinics bring and how the bullying
nature of opposing counsel contributes to the attacks on clinics’
continued viability, clinics may be able to come to solutions that are
more tractable and appealing, as well as develop defenses to ensure
their sustained viability.
including “[d]on’t [t]ake [i]t [p]ersonally”); Schecter, supra note 186, at 383, 393–94
(suggesting teaching of civility in law schools and other curricular changes).
219 See Mihaly, supra note 15, at 167–68 (“The decision-maker can tolerate using
testimony, comments or other normal inputs to the proceeding to move decisions within a
defined, if unexpressed range of possible outcomes; but if the desired outcome lies outside
that range, the participants must alter the political landscape through a sophisticated
political and public relations advocacy campaigns . . . .”). But see Manus, supra note 133,
at 500 (“It might be cynical to dismiss all environmental sentiment as a recurring fad that
waxes and wanes and sometimes disappears altogether, more or less the sideburns of the
social science world. It is probably the case, however, that the great majority of us persist
in relegating environmental values to the world of politics, where ‘the environmental
problem’ tends to knock around on the jumble table of hot-button issues along with
classroom prayer, funding for the arts, and TV violence.”).
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